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There is general agreement that the traditional command-and-control regulation of radio 
spectrum by the FCC (and NTIA) has failed. There is no general agreement on which regime 
should succeed it. Property rights advocates take Ronald Coase’s advice that spectrum licenses 
should be sold off and traded in secondary markets, like any other assets. Commons advocates 
argue that new technologies cannot be accommodated by a licensing regime (either traditional or 
property rights) and that a commons regime leads to the most efficient means to deliver useful 
spectrum to the American public. 
 
This article reviews the scholarly history of this controversy, outlines the revolution of 
FCC thinking, and parses the question of property rights vs. commons into four distinct parts: 
new technology, spectrum uses, spectrum management, and the overarching legal regime. 
Advocates on both sides find much to agree about on the first three factors; the disagreement is 
focused on the choice of overarching regime to most efficiently and effectively make spectrum 
and its applications available to the American public. There are two feasible regime choices: a 
property rights regime and a mixed licensed/commons regime subject to regulation. 
 
The regime choice depends upon four factors: dispute resolution, transactions costs, 
tragedies of the commons and anticommons, and flexibility to changing technologies and 
demands. Each regime is described and analyzed against these four factors. With regard to pure 
transactions costs, commons may hold an advantage but it appears quite small. For all other 
factors, the property rights regime holds very substantial advantages relative to the mixed 
regime. I conclude that the choice comes down to markets vs. regulation as mechanism for 
allocating resources.   - 2-   
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Introduction – The State of Play 
 
The use of the electromagnetic spectrum for telecommunications and other functions has 
traditionally been closely regulated by government agencies in most countries.  In the 
US, television and radio broadcasting, microwave transmission, cellular and cordless 
phones, CB and family radio, amateur (ham) radio, and more recently WiFi and other 
home networking technologies all operate under frequency assignments, power 
constraints and location restrictions established and enforced by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC)
1  This system was established by the 1927 Radio 
Act, initially administered by the Federal Radio Agency and then by the FCC since its 
inception in 1934.  Generally, broadcasters of radio energy must apply for and receive a 
license,
2 which sets forth restrictions on the frequency, power limit, and perhaps direction 
and time of day that the licensee is permitted, and also sets forth the specific use 
permitted by the license, such as FM broadcasting, cellular telephony, taxi dispatch, and 
so forth.  These licenses are generally time-limited, but there is a strong presumption of 
renewal of the license at its expiration. 
 
The rationale for maintaining this extensive licensing system is radio interference.  
Interference occurs when two or more signals of the same (or similar) frequency and 
power arrive at a receiver simultaneously, and the receiver cannot distinguish between 
the wanted signal and the interfering signal(s).  In the early days of radio, conflicting 
broadcasters in the same geographic area interfered with each others’ signals, so that 
listeners could not enjoy their preferred broadcasts.  By assigning broadcasters to specific 
frequencies in specific localities and limiting their broadcast power, the FCC created an 
interference-free space in which listeners could hear their preferred broadcaster.  
Specifically, the FCC allocated broad swaths of frequency to particular uses, such as 
radio broadcast, taxi dispatch, and police and fire services.  Within each swath and in 
each locality, particular users were licensed to use specific frequencies, such as a radio 
broadcaster or a police department.  Thus, the use of the frequency was also constrained; 
taxi dispatch services, for example, could not be used by radio broadcasters.  This 
frequency/location/power/use allocation mechanism was a feasible approach for early 
radio to solve the interference problem, and has remained so up until recently, as new 
technologies are becoming available. 
 
History 
The history of spectrum management since the earliest days has been amply documented 
elsewhere;
3 I give only the bare outlines of that history, relevant to the purposes of this 
                                                 
1 The National Telecommunications and Information Agency of the Department of Commerce manages all 
Federally operated spectrum, such as used by the Department of Defense, Federal Aviation Agency, and so 
forth.  The FCC regulates all other spectrum. 
2 As we shall see in detail below, the FCC has also set aside important frequency bands for unlicensed use, 
such as cordless phones, garage door openers and WiFi. 
3 Ellen Goodman nicely summarizes several versions of this history in Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to 
Come, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 269-404 (2004) note 34, at 282.  See also Thomas Hazlett, The Wireless 
Craze, The Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, The Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald 
Coase's "Big Joke": An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335 (2001);Yochai 
Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally Networked Environment, 11   - 4-   
paper. 
 
The command-and-control system of administrative allocation of 
frequency/location/power/use spectrum licenses was and is the dominant form of 
spectrum management regime throughout the developed world.  As the uses of radio 
multiplied, the FCC and regulators around the world allocated and assigned spectrum for 
AM-FM radio, analog (and later digital) television, microwave communications, garage 
door operators, cordless phones, industrial and scientific purposes, amateur (ham) radio, 
airport and aircraft radar, CB radio, and a host of other applications.  Such licenses were 
granted on the basis of the licensee operating “in the public interest,” a rather elastic 
standard with widely varying interpretations over time.  Conditions were often applied to 
the granting of such licenses, such as build-out requirements; licenses could be revoked if 
these conditions were not met.  In practice, however, the grant of a license was a grant in 
perpetuity, and was quite difficult for the FCC to recover should spectrum needs change. 
 
As might be expected, this highly inflexible bureaucratic allocation mechanism has given 
rise to huge inefficiencies, noted by virtually all scholars and by the FCC itself.
4  The 
administrative licensing mechanism was initially challenged in a seminal article by 
Ronald Coase,
5 in which he questioned why licenses should be allocated by 
administrative fiat and suggested that radio licenses should be bought and sold like any 
other scarce commodity in our economy.  In this model, radio licenses would be owned 
by the licensee, who would have the right to use, exclude use by others, buy, sell, lease, 
subdivide and aggregate the license.  Coase asked the obvious question: why should this 
valuable commodity be allocated by a regulatory agency, as if the US were a planned 
economy?  Why not treat licenses as we do every other good in our market economy, and 
let it be bought and sold?  In that way, the market would assure that radio licenses would 
migrate to their highest valued use, rather than migrate to those whose political and 
bureaucratic power was strongest. 
 
Apparently, this question was not quite so obvious to others at the time.  Although 
Professor Coase was later awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics, his idea of marketable 
                                                                                                                                                 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 298 (1998) (hereinafter  “Agoraphobia”), and Gerald Faulhaber and David 
Farber, Spectrum Management: Property Rights, Markets, and the Commons, in RETHINKING RIGHTS AND 
REGULATIONS  INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO NEW COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, eds Lorrie Faith 
Cranor and Steven S. Wildman (2003). 
4 For example, in the 1950s, the FCC designed the experiment of UHF television, committing 330 Mhz of 
frequency space in locations around the country, in the hopes of fostering localism in broadcasting.  This 
experiment failed; however, there are hundreds of license holders throughout the US that continue to hold 
onto these licenses, and so the spectrum cannot be used for any other purpose (See Faulhaber and Farber, 
supra, note 3 at 197).  The value of this underutilized spectrum can be inferred from the fact that the entire 
frequency bandwidth devoted to digital wireless cellular service is no more than 180 Mhz.  Opening up the 
current UHF band to wireless could almost double the capacity of the US wireless industry.  Additionally, 
studies by Agilent Technology of the power spectrum in Santa Rosa, CA show that aside from the fairly 
narrow digital wireless bands and the WiFi band, virtually all the spectrum between 1.5 Ghz and 3.0 Ghz is 
almost completely unutilized. And a recent study in Brussels, Belgium finds similar vast underutilization of 
spectrum in a major European city (see Patrick S. Ryan, Some Tests of Spectrum Usage in Brussels, 
Belgium . Droit & Nouvelles Technologies, September 28, 2004). 
5 Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 25–26, 35–38 (1959).  .     - 5-   
spectrum licenses was considered radical in the extreme at the time, bordering on the 
crackpot.  Indeed, in 1959 the Federal Communications Commission invited Professor 
Coase to testify about his proposal for market allocation of radio spectrum rights. FCC 
Commissioner Philip S. Cross asked the first question: “Is this all a big joke?”
6  A 
University of Chicago colleague called this “an insight more fundamental than we can 
use.”
7  Eventually, Coase’s idea took root. 
 
Coase’s insight was that substantial inefficiencies would result from government 
allocation of this valuable commodity, a fact now firmly documented, both in the US and 
abroad.  He accepted that the unit of transaction was the frequency/locality/power/use
8 
license (as indeed there were no other options at the time); his remedy was to replace the 
administrative bureaucratic allocation mechanism with discipline of market allocation. 
 
Coase’s ideas did not take root until much later, and only then incompletely: the US 
Congress permitted the FCC to conduct auctions of spectrum licenses in 1993, and the 
FCC held its first auction in 1995.
9  Other countries have followed suit.  However, these 
licenses are as constrained in that once won at auction they cannot be bought and sold 
without FCC review and permission.  However, the partial adoption of Coase’s ideas is 
perhaps best viewed in the broader sweep of policy thinking of the latter half of the 20
th 
century, towards market-based allocation mechanisms and away from administrative and 
regulatory allocation mechanisms, popularly referred to as deregulation.  This mode of 
economic thinking has become something of the received wisdom in policy circles, both 
in the US and abroad.  The partial acceptance of Coase’s ideas concerning market-based 
allocation of spectrum licenses coincided with the acceptance of market-based 
approaches over regulation approaches to policy issues. 
 
 
The State of Play: Round 1 
 
During the 1990s, a number of economic scholars
10 published a series of articles 
elucidating and elaborating the idea of market-based spectrum license allocation, 
maintaining a gentle pressure on the public policy process to move in this direction.  
                                                 
6 Cited in Thomas Hazlett, supra, at 340. 
7 Harry Kalven, Jr., Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. & ECON. 15, 30 
(1967), as cited in Ellen Goodman, supra note 3, at 270. 
8 Professor Coase seems to have not included “use” in his definition of a marketable spectrum license, 
relying only on frequency, location, and power.  Later advocates of marketable licenses have adopted this 
approach.  A much more complete proposal for defining complete property rights in spectrum licenses is 
contained in Arthur S. De Vany et al ., A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic 
Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499 (1969), in which the authors 
propose a frequency/location/power paradigm (and time as well, assuming time sharing of licenses), with 
no use restrictions. 
9 New Zealand and India preceded the US in employing spectrum auctions. 
10 Gregory L. Rosston & Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spectrum Policy to Promote the Public 
Interest, 50 FED.COMM. L.J. 87, 93 (1997); Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights 
Approach to Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 53 (1999); Lawrence J. White, 
“Propertyzing” the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It’s Important, and How to Begin, 9 MEDIA L. &   - 6-   
 
In sum, economists have sought a regime change: from administrative bureaucratic 
allocation of licenses to market allocation of licenses.  They have done so for the simple 
Coasian argument put forward in 1959: to vastly increase the economic efficiency of the 
use of this important resource. 
 
However, a challenge to this reform proposal came from a group of technologists and 
legal scholars who agreed with the economic critique that regulation had resulted in great 
inefficiencies, but sharply disagreed with the market-based remedy.  They noted that new 
technologies permitted new forms of interference avoidance that did not rely on the 
frequency/location/power paradigm.  Instead, these new technologies would use 
processing power and real-time avoidance systems to solve the interference problem 
without the restrictions of frequency/location/power licenses.  Advocates of this approach 
argue that a commons regime is far more appropriate than a license/property regime for 
these new technologies, and they predict tremendous spectrum abundance through the use 
of these new technologies in a commons environment.  Technologists and legal scholars 
(and indeed some economists) also seek regime change: from administrative bureaucratic 
allocation of exclusive licenses to a commons regime.  A radical approach that would 
appear to be supported by these new technologies.
11 
 
Two technologies (and one architecture) of particular interest are (i) agile radio 
(sometimes referred to as cognitive radio, one of a general class called software-defined 
radio); (ii) ultrawideband; and (iii) mesh networks.
12 
 
Agile Radio “Agile” radios are devices in which a radio can determine if a specific 
frequency band is currently in use, emit in that band if not, and switch to another band in 
microseconds if another user begins to emit in that band.  Agility may be hardwired into a 
device, but it may also occur in the form of software defined radio (SDR), a term that 
covers a rather broad category of devices and includes any device in which the received 
radio signal is processed by software.
13  Both transmitter and receiver must be agile for 
this system to function.  For example, in principle an agile radio transmitter could use an 
empty ham radio band (or government military band) to communicate with an agile radio 
receiver; should a ham operator (or military user) start using that band,
14 the transmitter 
would shift to another band within microseconds (the receiver presumably shifting as 
                                                                                                                                                 
POL’Y 19 (2000); and Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did 
FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529, 534 (1998); Evan Kwerel and Alex D. 
Felker; Using Auctions to Select FCC Licensees OPP Working Paper 16, May 1985 at < 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp16.pdf> 
11 The first writings to call for this regime change are, inter alia, Lawrence Lessig, THE FUTURE OF 
IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 221–22 (2001); and Yochai 
Benkler, “Agoraphobia” supra, note 3. 
12 This technology description is taken from Faulhaber and Farber, supra, note 3 at 133-137. 
13 An excellent non-engineering description of this technology is David Marsh, “Software Defined Radio 
Tunes In” EDN, March 3, 2005, 52, at <http://www.edn.com/contents/images/505082.pdf>.  My thanks to 
David Farber for bringing this article to my attention. 
14 Current technologies that use “listen before talk” may not completely avoid interference with agile radio.  
Some form of “get permission before talk” may be necessary.   - 7-   
well, according to a pre-arranged script) and the agile radio communication could 
continue while the ham operator used of original band.  Provided the agile radio switches 
its emissions to another band, it need not interfere with the ham band.  As long as there 
are sufficient frequency bands so that the agile radio pair can always find an unused band, 
agile radio achieves a more efficient use of bandwidth without interference with existing 
licensees. 
 
Agile radio creates this increased efficiency by dynamic allocation of spectrum, rather 
than the current static allocation approach, common to both the current licensing regime 
and a property rights regime.
15  For many purposes, static allocation is the efficient 
solution; AM-FM and TV broadcasting of continuous content to the existing huge base of 
relatively simple receivers will be a very important spectrum use for years to come, and 
static allocation works perfectly for this application.  But dynamic allocation for certain 
uses can improve the efficiency of spectrum allocation, perhaps dramatically.  In light of 
the inefficiencies of the current licensing regime, this would appear to be an important 
improvement.  Note, however, this is not without cost; dynamic allocation not only 
requires substantially more sophisticated transceivers but may also use frequency space 
for needed signaling purposes. 
 
Agile radio is not without problems.  Currently, if a licensee experiences interference, it 
has only a few neighbors who are likely causing that interference, and can easily check 
out the source of the interference and take action to suppress it.  But since agile radios 
may be able to transmit anywhere in the spectrum, an interfering agile radio may evade 
detection and identification, so that victims of its interference have no clue as to the 
responsible party.  Although some have called this “opportunistic” radio, perhaps “hit and 
run” radio is more deserved.  It may be the case that technology may eventually fix this 
problem, but it appears to be very far from being fixed at this writing. 
 
Wideband This form of radio emissions can be used for a variety of purposes, including 
ground penetration, through-the-wall imaging, and short-range “radar” for vehicles.  It 
can also be used for two-way communications.  The most successful wideband 
application today is spread spectrum, used in many cordless phones.  This technology 
allows a signal to be “spread” across a range of frequencies, trading off power for 
bandwidth.  Ultra-wideband (UWB) operates similarly but in a more extreme form.  The 
signal to be transmitted is captured in small time intervals (about 1 microsecond) and the 
signal is converted to a set of very short pulses  (about 1 picosecond) and these pulses are 
broadcasted over a very wide bandwidth (greater than 1 GHz); the broadcaster emits this 
picosecond pulse in a time slot every microsecond at very low power; the receiver (which 
must be synchronized) picks up the low power signal over this wide bandwidth, and 
converts it back to (a very good approximation of) the original signal. 
 
UWB radios essentially trades off lots of power for lots of bandwidth.  The power per 
unit of bandwidth of the emission is extremely low;
16 for most purposes, it is part of the 
                                                 
15 Within a licensed frequency band, the licensee may use dynamic allocation; in fact, conventional cellular 
systems today multiplex many users on a common group of channels dynamically. 
16 With the exception of ground-penetrating radar (GPR), which is quite powerful and would be an   - 8-   
background radio noise, and non-UWB receivers that are designed to reject noise would 
not recognize the signal, so there is no interference with high-powered broadcasters. The 
useful range of UWB at these power levels is rather short, at most a mile or two.  
Interference with other UWB emitters is unlikely; emitters more than, say, five miles 
apart can use the same transmit time slot without interference with each other, and there 
are many time slots.  Additionally, UWB is fault-tolerant, in that the frequency pattern 
transmitted in the picosecond burst can suffer some degradation and the original signal 
can still be recovered. 
 
On the other hand, the bandwidth of the UWB signal spans a large fraction of the total 
frequency available to all, and appears (if undetected) at many frequencies for which 
licensees hold exclusive use.
17  Some license holders that purchased their licenses at 
auction have objected that UWB is a violation of their frequency license, regardless of 
the fact that it cannot be detected or otherwise interfere with their use of the license.
18 
 
Mesh Networks Wireless mesh networking is a wireless architecture that can use 
different forms of radio transmission, including UWB, agile radio, even cellular.  A mesh 
network of (say) computers
19 in a neighborhood could communicate (possibly at high 
bandwidth) with a nearby computer similarly equipped that could connect directly into 
the Internet (or possibly the telephone network).
20  Indeed, the connection may pass 
through many computers before connecting to the Internet, relaying the connection from 
one mesh point to the next, and the next. To help establish the mesh, wireless Network 
Access Points (NAP) could be seeded throughout the mesh region as relay points, in 
addition to the existing computers. Apart from the few NAPs required to seed the 
network, there is no infrastructure such as cables or fiber optics needed for mesh 
networks.  The wireless devices themselves form the network, much as the Internet 
currently operates. 
 
Mesh networks use much less power than conventional systems which need every 
computer to reach a central antenna.  A mesh networked computer need only reach the 
nearest networked computer, and thus needs less power.  The architecture takes full 
advantage of the relay capabilities of the mesh devices to lower power requirements and 
therefore minimize interference problems.  Because of this, mesh networks are claimed to 
actually increase their capacity as the geographic density of users increases, a claim 
dependent upon a smooth distribution of devices and an absence of bottlenecks that may 
                                                                                                                                                 
interfering use if not pointed into the ground. 
17 Note that UWB radio could broadcast at much higher power and have a greatly extended range; however, 
that would lift emissions out of the noise and become an interfering use.  Even now, certain existing low 
power uses such as Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers claim UWB can cause interference with 
their systems if operated at somewhat higher power levels than recently approved by the FCC. 
18 Comments of Sprint Corporation, In re Issues Related to the Commission’s Spectrum Policies, ET 
Docket No. 02-135, at 10–11 (F.C.C. filed July 8, 2002). 
19 Mesh network architecture can be used not only for computers but also for voice and indeed any radio 
transmission; it can also be used with a mix of transmission technologies, such as agile, UWB, cellular, CB 
radio, etc. 
20 A current example of a mesh network is Metricom’s Ricochet network (now emerging from bankruptcy) 
which had some thousands of users in multiple cities at its peak.  Metricom was based on ideas and patents 
of Paul Baran (see http://www.ricochet.net).  Ricochet is NAP-based rather than peer-to-peer based.   - 9-   
not obtain under field conditions.  In other networks (such as cellular), increasing density 
actually decreases available capacity because of interference. 
 
If mesh networks are so wonderful, one might ask, why do we not see them in practice?  
In fact, mesh networks have a number of very practical difficulties that must be overcome 
before they are field-practical.  (i) The density of devices in a geographic area must be 
relatively high in order for low-power mesh networks to hop from device to device.  This 
is a particular problem for a new service in which device densities are necessarily low.  It 
is also a particular problem for a mobile service in which device density changes minute 
to minute as devices move around.  (ii)  Owners of devices must be willing to leave their 
devices connected and powered in order to act as a relay for others.  However, being a 
relay has no immediate benefit and drains battery life, giving users an incentive to “free 
ride” and not provide relay functions.  (iii) Communications are likely to travel over 
many links before they reach their destination, resulting in delays.  Human conversation 
is highly sensitive to such delays and mesh networks are unlikely to be useful for voice 
traffic.
21  These problems may yet be overcome with new technology, but nothing on the 
immediate horizon suggests solutions to these problems. 
 
Technology Assessment The potential for these new technologies to vastly improve the 
efficiency of spectrum use is very promising.  However, there are three points to keep in 
mind in evaluating the role of these technologies.  (i) None of these technologies are 
currently deployed in a commercial setting; they exist in theoretical papers, lab results, 
and early field tests.
22  (ii) While these technologies may enable a commons regime (if 
they completely supplant existing technology), they are perfectly capable of deployment 
in the context of a licensing/property regime; they are a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for a commons regime.  (iii)  There are many applications for which the new 
technologies are simply an unnecessary expense; TV/radio broadcasting, airport radars 
and a host of other high-powered dedicated uses are much better served via exclusive 
licensing.  This is not to imply that these technologies will not become increasingly 
important; they certainly will.  But it does mean that (i) this won’t happen tomorrow; (ii) 
they can work their efficiency magic in either a commons regime or a property regime; 
and (iii) they are very unlikely to supplant exclusive licenses for all or even most uses. 
 
                                                 
21 Delay in transmission is called “latency” in engineering.  Certain applications, such as voice telephony, 
require very low latency to be useful.  Other applications, such as e-mail, do not. 
22 In fact, each of these technologies as they exist today has technical and operational difficulties that 
prevent its early deployment.  UWB is perhaps closest to deployment, but is a very low power service, and 
thus only appropriate for services in which transmitters and receivers are quite close.  Agile radio (indeed, 
software defined radio) are still rather costly to produce, and the protocols needed to behave well in an 
opportunistic setting are still on the drawing board (although see Marsh, supra, for a thorough analysis of 
SDR’s problems and prospects).  Mesh networks is actually a rather old idea; the Internet itself can be 
thought of as a mesh network, albeit not a wireless mesh.  In order for a mesh network to provide an 
acceptable quality of service to its customers, there must be a fairly dense deployment of communicating 
devices and/or NAPs.  This is difficult to guarantee with mobile devices, where density (devices/mi
2) can 
vary dynamically.  Additionally, the use of many relay points in the mesh prior to connecting to the Internet 
or telephone network can introduce delays that are unacceptable to latency-sensitive applications such as 
voice.  Again, this is not to say that these problems cannot be solved; it is to say that they won’t be solved 
tomorrow and these technologies may well yield less than today’s theoretical models promise.   - 10-   
The enthusiasm of the early work on commons and the new technologies suggested that 
all of wireless communications could be managed as a commons regime, doing away 
with all exclusive use and permitting users to self-manage their own frequency spaces 
through voluntary limited commons and protocol agreements among manufacturers.  The 
early papers suggested that there may be some limited role for regulation, to ensure the 
proper functioning of the commons, but that this regulation was to be “light.”  The 
commons was to be largely self-regulating, drawing on ideas of communities managing a 
resource for mutual gain.  There were to be no intermediaries, such as cell phone 
companies or other service providers.  Services would be provided by the users and the 
devices they used, and interference would be controlled using protocols embedded in 
hardware. 
 
This vision appears strikingly similar to the pre-1995 Internet of John Perry Barlow, and 
the early authors certainly come from this tradition.  There are several related policy 
ideas that commons authors share, such as opposition to copyright and other intellectual 
property mechanisms, and a general concern over the degradation of the intellectual 
commons in American life.
23  These writings have a strong tenor that ownership (of 
spectrum license, of copyrights, of patents…), especially by corporations, lead to 
exclusion and resource underutilization, while commons ensures full access untrammeled 
by profit-seeking intermediaries.
24  The commons is asserted to be a superior mechanism 
for encouraging free speech, although no proof is offered for this highly debatable 
proposition.
25  Similar arguments are used to illustrate how the Internet, the quintessential 
commons, is being taken over by corporations.
26 
 
In “Round 1” of this conflict of ideas, economists approach spectrum management as the 
next battle of market forces against dirigiste regulation.  Technologists and some legal 
scholars approach spectrum as the next battle to save the commons and “public spaces” 
such as the Internet and public domain writings against rapacious corporations.  In both 
cases, spectrum management is part of a larger intellectual and policy agenda; 
unfortunately, the topic has become something of a battleground for the larger issues.  
This paper has a much more modest objective: to focus on the spectrum management 
issue exclusively, with the normative goal of achieving efficient and effective 
mechanisms for deploying spectrum resources to the American people.  I find much merit 
in both of the “big ideas;” but this paper is about spectrum management only; there is no 
larger agenda.  
 
The State of Play: Round 2 
                                                 
23 See Lessig, supra, for a powerful statement of this vision, of which spectrum commons is but a small 
part. 
24 See Lessig, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN 
CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY, 2004. 
25 Consider, for example, the ability of an individual caller to CNN’s “Larry King Live” television show to 
make her views known to the world and to that evening’s high-powered guest, compared to the paltry 
audience reachable via a cable system’s public access channel.  The former venue is a private network 
carried over private cable systems or licensed broadcast TV, to a huge audience.  The latter venue is an 
open access commons, which most viewers avoid like the plague.   
26 See Lessig, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, 2000.   - 11-   
 
In 2001-2003, the issues were joined in a series of conferences and moot courts, in which 
property rights vs. commons conflict was hotly debated.  Several papers grew out of this 
ongoing debate.
27  But the overall picture was accommodation: commons advocates 
recognized that there was a continuing need for dedicated spectrum for applications such 
as radars and AM-FM broadcasting, so that the regime of the future must accommodate 
both licensed exclusive use spectrum and commons spectrum.  Professor Benkler
28 
suggested that the FCC oversee a ten-year experiment, managing licensed spectrum and 
commons spectrum side by side, until it became clear which alternative was superior.  
Property rights advocates noted that the success of unlicensed spectrum
29 set aside by the 
FCC suggested that the regime of the future must accommodate unlicensed use.  In 
particular, Faulhaber-Farber proposed a commons-type structure within a property rights 
regime in the form of a non-interfering easement applicable to all (or most) license 
property, in which the property owner must accept the use of his 
frequency/location/power license by anyone who does not interfere with his own use 
(which has absolute priority).
30,31  For example, low-power UWB would be covered by 
this easement, to the extent that it operates under the noise floor and creates no 
interference.
32,33  Agile radio would also be covered to the extent that agile users leave a 
frequency band within microseconds of the owner initiating the use of this band, and 
otherwise cause no interference.  Both sides also recognized that there were very 
substantial uncertainties regarding the future development of both wireless technologies 
                                                 
27 On the commons side, see inter alia, Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25, 82–83 (2002); Stuart Buck, Replacing Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum 
Commons, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2; and Eli M. Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday’s Heresy, 
Today’s Orthodoxy, Tomorrow’s Anachronism: Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access, 41 J.L. & 
ECON. 765, 778–80 (1998).  On the property rights side, see inter alia, Faulhaber-Farber, supra, note 3; 
Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Private and Public Control, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2007 (2003); James B. Speta, A Vision of Internet Openness by Government Fiat, 96 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1553, 1572 (2002) ( review of Lessig, supra, note 11). 
28 Supra ,note 27. 
29 I use the term “success” advisedly; a true success would involve a demonstration that the net benefit of 
unlicensed use exceeds the net benefit of deploying the same spectrum in other licensed uses (such as 
cellular telephony).  While we have some estimates of both market value and social value of licensed 
spectrum, we have no such estimates for unlicensed spectrum.  In this instance, “success” is defined 
modestly: unlicensed spectrum seems to work for its intended use. 
30 Faulhaber-Farber, supra, note 3, at 145.  In principle, a market in spectrum rights could achieve the same 
goal; opportunistic users could bargain in real time with license owners for temporary underlay rights.  
However, the transaction costs of such a real-time pricing system for opportunistic uses seem excessive; the 
non-interfering easement would avoid these costs, although the easement is not without costs. 
31 A very similar proposal is made in Yochai Benkler, Some Economics, supra note 27, at 55. 
32 Note that the actual level of the noise floor, below which signals are unintelligible, is not a constant of 
nature; it may depend upon the sensitivity and selectivity of the assumed receivers of the signal. 
33 This would appear to be similar to the FCC’s Interference Temperature proposal, which proposes using 
“white space” between the noise floor and the “usable” floor in licensed spectrum for unlicensed use.  See 
Federal Communications Commission, Establishment of an Interference Temperature Metric to Quantify 
and Manage Interference and to Expand Available Unlicensed Operation in Certain Fixed, Mobile and 
Satellite Frequency Bands ET Docket No. 03-237, November 28, 2003 at  
<http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-289A1.pdf >.  The proposed non-interfering 
easement is agnostic regarding the particular noise level, and is neither and endorsement nor a rejection of 
the interference temperature proposal.   - 12-   
and the uses for wireless, and any regime adopted had to be capable of adaptation as 
these uncertainties resolved themselves in the coming years.  The only feasible regime 
was one that was flexible enough to adapt to change.  Neither commons nor exclusive 
licenses could be ruled out at this time. 
 
In this Round, several “tragedies” arguments surfaced. Property rights advocates 
criticized commons advocates for ignoring the “tragedy of the commons,” which arises 
when a free resource is over-used and over-congested.  The classic case is open ocean 
fisheries, such as the Grand Bank off the coast of Newfoundland, traditionally the richest 
fishery in the world.  As the technology of fishing improved, commercial fishermen 
increased their catch dramatically and eventually depleted the resource almost 
completely.  Since the fishery commons was available to all, no one was responsible for 
the overall health of the resource; the incentive of each individual fisherman was to take 
as much as possible from the resource, because if they didn’t someone else would.  
Commons advocates argued that the new technologies freed up so much spectrum that it 
would be abundant; scarcity would be a thing of the past, and there would be enough for 
all.  The tragedy of the commons would not occur because spectrum would be so 
abundant. Further, protocols embedded in device hardware would ensure against 
interference and the tragedy of the commons. 
 
Commons advocates also alluded to the “tragedy of the anticommons,” a problem that 
occurs with private property.
34  Suppose a town or developer wants to put together a large 
parcel of land for a project, such as a beachfront walkway or a shopping center.  This 
requires the aggregation of land; since the land is usually contiguous parcels, the 
town/developer must deal with certain buyers, who are likely to hold out for a large 
payment, recognizing that the project can only happen if they agree.  This is actually a re-
badging of the “holdup” problem, well-known in both law and economics, and it suggests 




Round 2 thus moved the opposing sides somewhat closer, but neither could claim a 
conceptual breakthrough.  The concept of a non-interfering easement appeared to add 
something novel to the mix.
35  What is perhaps more important is that both sides 
recognized the importance of transaction costs and dispute resolution in determining the 
optimal regime for the future of spectrum.  This changed the tenor of the debate from 
philosophical/ideological to practical and results-oriented.  At the end of the day, what 
matters is how effectively either regime gets spectrum into the hands of those who value 
                                                 
34 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621 (1998).  An economic model of the anticommons is in James Buchanan 
and Yong Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons  43 Journal of Law and Economics, 1 
(2000). 
35 While the easement concept was novel to the debate, it is very similar to the well-established concept of 
secondary allocation, in which a licensed or unlicensed device can use a frequency band provided it caused 
no interference.  There are minor differences between the two concepts, but this approach is neither radical 
or untested.   - 13-   
it most.  Commons advocates claimed that a market in licenses would have large 
transaction costs and dispute resolution would be very costly.  Property right advocates 
noted that commons advocates had yet to address the problem of transaction costs and 
dispute resolution in a commons system, but simply hoped that a regulator would resolve 
all such problems, without addressing the costs of regulation.  While the “tragedies” of 
commons and anticommons were raised, there was no resolution.  However, this round of 
writings simply suggested that this was the appropriate research agenda if we wished to 
make progress on determining the better regime for spectrum management. 
 
The State of Play – Round 3 
 
The current Round 3 of papers,
36 of which this paper is one, attempt to drill down into the 
detail of how property rights would actually work and how commons would actually 
work, considering issues of future flexibility, transactions costs, and dispute resolution.  
While by no means free of ideology, the papers of Round 3 are much more focused on 
problem solving and much less concerned with lofty visions of how the world ought to 
be.  Werbach, for example, proposes his Supercommons as a way for exclusive licenses 
and commons to cohabitate, but with a strong preference for commons.  Goodman is 
more focused on dispute resolution; her most valuable contribution is a very thorough 
analysis of how nuisance law is an inefficient mechanism for dispute resolution, 
presumably in a property rights regime.  She recommends regulation of a combined 
licensed and commons spectrum.   
 
This paper continues in this problem-solving spirit, eschewing grand social visions in 
favor of getting the job done.  After reviewing what changes are afoot at the FCC, I parse 
the problem into areas in which commons and property rights advocates agree and the 
one area (the overarching legal regime) in which we don’t.  I then assess the merits and 
drawbacks of each regime in terms of transactions cost, dispute resolution, and flexibility 
to respond to future changes in technology and demands.  I conclude that a property 
rights regime is substantially superior to a commons regime using these criteria. 
 
 
Meanwhile, in the Real World… 
 
The FCC was not insensitive to this debate; indeed, the Commission had instituted 
changes in the traditional command-and-control licensing model decades ago.  One of the 
earliest and best known service was CB radio, a personal wireless communication service 
that did not require owners of CB equipment to be licensed in order to broadcast and 
receive.  The FCC set aside 40 voice channels in a frequency band that could be shared 
by anyone with FCC-approved equipment.  All conversations were public in that they 
could be heard by anyone with a CB receiver.  Early users of the service, primarily 
professional drivers, developed social protocols to facilitate effective sharing of the 
                                                 
36 Inter alia, Thomas Hazlett, Property Rights and Wireless License Values, AEI-Brookings Joint Center 
Working Paper No. 04-08; Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Private 
and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2007 (2003); Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified 
Theory of Wireless Communications, 82 Texas L. Rev. 863; Ellen Goodman, supra, note 3.   - 14-   
limited channels.  The service became wildly popular in the mid-1970s, with sales 
increasing by a factor of ten, but by the end of the 1970s its popularity had waned.   A 
number of other services were introduced in the 1970s and 1980s in so-called unlicensed 
spectrum, such as cordless telephones, garage door openers, and wireless weather stations 
(in which an outdoor sensor unit, mounted on the roof or outside wall of a home, 
communicated wirelessly with an indoor display unit).  Most of these services were 
offered using “Part 15” devices, limited to certain frequency bands.  They share a number 
of properties: (i) no license was necessary for a user to operate the device; (ii) a relatively 
small number of manufacturers produced the actual radio emitters, each of which was 
type-certified by the FCC; and (iii), perhaps most important, power levels were quite low.  
This latter property was crucial to the control of interference; users would not want their 
cordless phone conversations picked up by their neighbor’s cordless phone; nor would 
they want their garage door opener to open their neighbor’s garage door.
37 
 
In fact, frequencies devoted to Part 15 devices became a focus of innovation.  New 
technologies could be tried out without making a substantial commitment to obtain 
licensed spectrum first.  Perhaps the best-known success in this unlicensed spectrum is 
WiFi, a high-bandwidth short-range (100-250 ft) wireless technology which has become 
a standard for wireless home networking.  It is also offered in public spaces, such as 
coffee shops, airports and hotels.  Some municipalities have announced plans to deploy 




The successful deployment of WiFi is a strong argument that a commons approach, in 
which interference is controlled by hardware, can work.  The FCC has indeed been a 
“light” regulator of the unlicensed spectrum; it specified only frequency and power 
limits, and let the market decide what devices and what protocols would be deployed.  In 
recent years, the FCC has dedicated new frequency bands for unlicensed use, and has 
indicated its intent to continue to do so. 
 
On a parallel track, the FCC has also moved strongly in a pro-market direction.  Of 
course, the success of the auctions for PCS cellular services is the best-known market 
initiative, and the FCC continues to roll out new spectrum at auction.  But the initial 
licenses sold at auction were still of the traditional form: they could not be bought, sold 
or leased without explicit FCC permission, and their use was tightly restricted: cellular 
licenses could not be used for TV broadcasting, and vice-versa.  The FCC has been 
                                                 
37 Apparently, even these low power levels were not sufficient to eliminate all interference.  The FCC 
adopted a novel technology, spread spectrum, for use with 900 MHz cordless phones to secure phone calls 
(though this technology was strongly contested at the FCC).  Garage door opener firms adopted a technique 
called “rolling codes” to eliminate opening neighbors’ garage doors.  Both these approaches presaged the 
technologies mentioned above: ultrawideband and agile radios.  And both approaches suggest that there 
may be private means of resolving interference problems using technology rather than licenses, a key point 
of the commons advocates. 
38 See, for example, Wireless Philadelphia Executive Committee Briefing, at 
http://www.phila.gov/wireless/briefing.html for a description of Philadelphia’s well-publicized WiFi 
initiative.   - 15-   
moving to relax both these constraints.  A recent Report and Order
39 seeks to establish an 
active secondary market in spectrum licenses by making FCC approval of such transfers 
virtually automatic (provided these transfers do not involve public safety).  The FCC also 
seeks to establish rules for band managers; firms that would hold the spectrum license 
and lease part or the entire spectrum to others.  Additionally, it has increasingly included 
“flexible use” in its service definitions, allowing licensees substantial freedom to deploy 
their licensed spectrum, provided they still abided by the technical 
(frequency/location/power) limits. 
 
The FCC has also initiated consideration of the non-interfering easement concept 
suggested by Faulhaber-Farber,
40 at least in the context of ultrawideband.  In this 
proceeding,
41 the FCC is considering whether to authorize opportunistic uses of licensed 
spectrum when not being used by the licensee. 
  
The FCC also established a Spectrum Policy Task Force to take a broad look at spectrum 
management and to make recommendations to the Commission.  It specifically examined 
the two options of property rights with markets, commons, as well as the traditional 
command-and-control regulation.
42  The Report recommends that all three models have a 
place in the overall FCC regulatory spectrum strategy: (i) continuing to allocate some 
spectrum at auction while relaxing constraints on use and encouraging secondary market 
(essentially, simulating a true property rights model); (ii) continuing to allocate spectrum 
bands for common use, especially in the higher frequencies; and (iii) for certain legacy 
uses, such as TV broadcasting and public safety, continuing command-and-control.  Of 
course, the overarching legal regime would be regulation; both market-based licenses and 
unlicensed spectrum would still be subject to regulatory oversight and government 
allocation of spectrum. 
 
This suggests that the traditional regulatory regime, universally despised by virtually all 
commentators and apparently the FCC itself, is being replaced by a regulatory regime 
that will contain within it both commons-managed spectrum and property rights/flexibly 
licensed managed spectrum (along with a legacy command-and-control sector, at least for 
some time).  Should these trends continue, it is likely the end-state of this evolution is 
end-state regulation (as distinct from traditional regulation) which in brief consists of a 
regulator overseeing all spectrum, of which a large fraction is flexibly licensed-managed, 
a large fraction is unlicensed commons-managed, and a diminishing fraction is 
traditionally regulated.  In the flexibly licensed-managed spectrum, licensees would own 
the licenses and could buy, sell, lease, subdivide and aggregate licenses, and use their 
                                                 
39 Federal Communications Commission, “In the Matter of Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through 
Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets” SECOND REPORT AND ORDER, ORDER ON 
RECONSIDERATION, AND SECOND FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING, WT Docket No. 00-230 
(2004) 
40 Faulhaber-Farber, supra, note  
41 See First Report and Order, Revision of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband 
Transmission Systems, 17 FCC Rcd. 10505 (2002). 
42 As reported in FCC, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT, ET Docket No. 02-135 (hereinafter “SPTF 
Report), (2002) 
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spectrum for a wide range of uses at their discretion..  They may also be subject to a non-
interfering easement.  The commons-managed, unlicensed spectrum would be subject to 
continued regulation as it is today.  As conditions changed, the FCC could adjust the 
assignment of spectrum to commons vs. property rights, could change the rules under 
which each commons-managed patch of spectrum was governed, and may even change 
the property rights of licensees should they deem it necessary.  For example, the 
Spectrum Policy Task Force Report suggests that the FCC may impose a “good 
neighbor” policy of “group[ing] technically compatible systems and devices in close 
spectrum proximity”
43 in order to increase efficiency of spectrum use.
44 
 
Parsing the Question 
 
This debate has been positioned as “property rights vs. commons;” it has also been 
positioned as new technology (favoring commons) vs. legacy technology (favoring 
licensing).
45  In this section, the question is parsed with somewhat more nuance; there 
appears to be at least four individual questions within the dispute, three of which are not 
really in dispute.  This analysis permits a focus on the core issues truly in dispute. 
 
There appear to be (at least) four levels of the “property rights vs. commons” debate: new 
technology, spectrum use, spectrum management, and the overarching legal regime.  
Each is discussed in turn: 
 
New Technology  
 
Much of the power of the commons advocates’ arguments is that the latest technology 
enables, indeed may demand, a commons approach to spectrum.  The arguments adduced 
include agile radio and ultrawideband as requiring a commons, and use of WiFi as a new 
technology introduced in the unlicensed space as the commons success story.  They also 
suggest that the deployment of mesh networks can lead to increases in bandwidth per user 
as the number of users increase.  It is noted above that these new technologies have some 
                                                 
43 SPTF Report, supra note 42, at 22. 
44 Although a transmitter may have a license to transmit only within a specified frequency band, its 
transmission may interfere with receivers in adjacent bands, either because the transmitter's power "leaks" 
into the adjacent band or because the receivers in the adjacent band cannot filter out the power emitted by 
the transmitter within its own band.  Both transmitters and receivers are equipped with band-pass filters, 
devices that limit the power transmitted outside the required frequencies or limit what is received outside 
the required frequencies, but such filters are not perfect.  For example, a low-powered use in a frequency 
adjacent to a high-powered use may experience interference, especially with poorly tuned receivers.  Thus, 
interference is a function of both the quality of the receiver and the quality of the transmitter. 
45 Another dimension along which battle lines seem to have been drawn is analogy: is spectrum like land, 
or is it like air?  Commons advocates argue the latter is the correct analogy, and conclude that since air is a 
common resource and is so managed, so must spectrum.  They allege that property rights advocates are led 
to error through the use of the land analogy.  In fact, this dimension has more to do with disciplinary 
differences than with the dispute itself.  Legal scholars traditionally argue from analogy, and it is often the 
case that once the profession settles on the right analogy, the issue is decided.  Economists, on the other 
hand, view analogy essentially as a teaching aid and not a research tool.  What spectrum is “like” is largely 
irrelevant to economists; what matters are its basic underlying physical and economic properties.  It is these 
properties, rather than analogies, which drive the economic logic.  The fight over the correct analogy is not 
a fight that economists understand or care about, and this paper will not engage in this fight.   - 17-   
way to go to demonstrate they are as transformative as their advocates claim, but let us 
arguendo assume the truth of their assertions.  Does this imply that new technologies 
only arise in an unlicensed environment, or that technological innovation is more likely to 
arise in a commons?  Does this imply that these new technologies can only be 
accommodated by a commons regime?  In both cases, the answer is no.  Regarding the 
environment of innovation, there have been extraordinary advances in cellular technology 
in antenna design and bandwidth utilization, spurred by competition and spectrum 
scarcity (albeit regulation-induced).  There is also very obvious innovation in cellular 
handsets and data capabilities in this market, suggesting that innovation has many outlets, 
not merely that of the commons.  Regarding the deployment of these new technologies in 
a licensed regime, Faulhaber-Farber’s non-interfering easement concept suggests that a 
small tweak on an exclusive licensing regime can easily accommodate these 
technologies.
46  In sum, these new technologies neither require a commons regime for 
their (as yet to develop) deployment, nor do they demonstrate the superiority of 
unlicensed spectrum as a source of innovation. 
 
As a general rule, there is a demand side and a supply side to technological innovation.  
The demand side of innovation is the new products that can be offered with innovation or 
cost savings realized via the innovation; in either case, the demand side is driven by 
adding value for customers.  The supply side of innovation is the cost of deploying the 
technology; the supply side is driven by the investment needed for deployment.  
Generally, we would anticipate that a property rights regime would be less risky for new 
service introduction as the entrepreneur would not face the risk of congestion, especially 
by copycat imitators using the same commons frequency band.  Indeed, the more 
successful the new service, the greater is the risk of congestion from copycats in the 
commons.  In addition, we would anticipate that a property rights regime gives strong 
incentives to adopt innovations that economize on spectrum, as this represents a direct 
benefit to license holders.  In a commons regime, there is no individual incentive to 
economize on spectrum; who would pay for an innovation that conserves on spectrum 
that is free to all?  On the other hand, unlicensed spectrum has the advantage that the 
entry costs (apart from the innovation itself) is virtually free; the innovative entrepreneur 
need not purchase spectrum in order to offer service.  Of course, in a market system, an 
innovator without ready capital could rent spectrum rather than buy it, thereby reducing 
entry costs.  On balance, then, the demand side of innovation favors a property rights 
regime while the supply side could be argued to favor a commons regime (although a 
market system can go far to reducing entry costs).  Generally, we would expect that 
innovations with great novelty but very uncertain customer value would find unlicensed 
spectrum a more attractive entry option, while innovations with more promise of 
customer value would find licensed spectrum a more attractive entry option.  A more 
likely outcome is that new innovators may deploy a trial service in unlicensed spectrum, 
and upon demonstration that the business model works the entrepreneur could migrate the 
                                                 
46 High-powered unlicensed agile radios almost surely will require some form of cooperation with licensees 
in order to avoid interference   At the very least, the potential for opportunistic use is likely to require that 
licensees monitor and record opportunistic users to ensure they operate within parameters.  Additionally, 
there are other technical problems that are difficult to solve without explicit cooperation of licensees, which 
may require equipment and cost mandates on licensees to accommodate easements for high-powered users.   - 18-   
service to licensed spectrum.  This has already occurred with the firm Clearwire, which 
offers wireless broadband Internet access.  Originally, Clearwire offered service in the 
unlicensed 2.4 Ghz (ISM) band.  After proving its technical and business plan, Clearwire 
has moved to licensed spectrum in the 2.5 Ghz (ITFS) band.
47  It currently offers wireless 
broadband Internet access in four US cities using licensed spectrum. 
 
Although the new technologies have been touted as enabling a commons regime, there 
are problems with using both high-powered agile/cognitive radios and low-powered mesh 
networks simultaneously in an open commons.  Generally, a commons is open to all 
users, high-powered and low-powered (up to a certain power limit).  Even if the high-
powered transmitter (such as an FM broadcaster) used agile/cognitive transceivers to 
avoid “collisions” with other high-powered transmitters, it is unlikely they could avoid 
interfering with low-power systems.  The high-power agile/cognitive radios using the 
“listen before talk” protocol may not even detect many of the low-power systems using 
the commons and therefore not be able to avoid interfering with them.  I refer to this as 
the power mix problem.
48   It is easy to solve the power mix problem in a property rights 
regime, as the license holder decides who and how the frequency band is to be used, 
within its overall power limit.  In a commons regime, the power mix problem appears 
only solvable by resorting to an intrusive regulatory regime.  But this is exactly what we 
already have with current FCC regulation, with well-known and unfortunate results. 
 
 
Spectrum Use  
 
The current array of wireless applications is simply dizzying, from cellular phones, 
broadcast TV and radio, WiFi, public safety radio, scientific and medical equipment, to 
GPS systems.  These applications are high power, low power, one-way broadcast, two-
way interactive, people-to-people voice and data, machine-to-machine, occasional vs. 
                                                 
47 Marcia Martinek, Clearwire picks Raze for first licensed trials 4 Wireless Review, Sept. 21, 2001 at 
<http://wirelessreview.com/ar/wireless_clearwire_picks_raze/>.  Similarly, Metricom, a company noted by 
commons advocates to have started a business in unlicensed spectrum, migrated to licensed spectrum as 
their business matured (to little avail; the firm has failed twice); see Thomas Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, 
The Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, The Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's 
"Big Joke": An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy 14 Harvard J. Law & Technology 335 (2001) at 
<http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/hazlett.pdf> 
48 There are potential solutions to this problem.  Low power systems could be agile radios themselves, since 
they can detect both high- and low-power transmissions in the relevant range; of course, this implies extra 
expense to low power systems, simply to avoid high-powered system interference.  It is also possible to 
restrict how many high-powered users are transmitting within a given commons band to ensure that the 
low-power users have sufficient bandwidth.  More drastically, a specific frequency band can be earmarked 
for low power only, simply by setting a low overall power limit.  But again, these options imply an 
intrusive regulatory solution: who decides the low power protocols for agile radio?  Who decides how 
many high powered transmitters will be allowed in a particular commons band?  Who decides which 
commons should be dedicated to low power only?  None of these solutions is particularly good, and all 
require a regulator to determine the protocols used and possibly to undertake flow control of users and 
traffic into the commons.  Experience has amply demonstrated that regulatory disputation over protocols 
are both excessively long and excessively costly.  Alternatively, if some commons are designated for low 
power only, the regulatory disputation over how much is low power only vs. how much is open commons 
would likewise be excessively long and excessively costly.   - 19-   
constant use, and all combinations thereof.  Some uses are particularly suited to exclusive 
use, such as high powered radar in constant use, TV and radio broadcast (again, in 
constant use).  Some uses are particularly suited to commons, such as low powered 
occasional uses such as garage door openers, cordless phones and home networking.  
And this is not the end; the uses of wireless are likely to continue their growth, as 
demands for new services are discovered and developed in the US and abroad.  But this 
expanding set of uses favors neither a commons approach nor a property rights approach.  
Indeed, it is the realization of this breadth of uses that has led advocates on both sides of 
this dispute to agree that both a commons and an exclusive use licensing approach 
somehow need to coexist for the foreseeable future. 
 
At a deeper level, the appropriateness of licensed vs. unlicensed spectrum management 
depends upon scarcity vs. abundance.  Commons advocates are fond of likening spectrum 
to the ocean, in which passing ships need only simple rules to avoid collisions.  There is 
no need to establish property rights in the ocean to avoid collisions.  But is the analogy 
correct?  It depends upon several factors: (i) avoidance using simple rules is easy because 
the ocean is essentially limitless; (ii) detection is easy with onboard radar; and (iii) ship 
passings only occur every few days.  If we slightly modify the analogy to large ships 
navigating in rivers and harbors, the situation changes radically: (i) avoidance is much 
more difficult as rivers and harbors are tightly constrained; (ii) radar in close quarters is 
rather cluttered and less useful; (iii) ship passings occur every few minutes.  Not 
surprisingly, the rules change; ship captains are not allowed to navigate within harbors 
and ship traffic is very tightly controlled by a harbormaster.  As the environment 
becomes more constrained and potential interference becomes greater, a much higher 
degree of control is required.  Applying this lesson to spectrum, the high demand for 
using spectrum suggests this is a harbor, not an ocean.  To make matters even more 
contentious, we note that in the ocean/harbor analogy, avoiding collisions is in 
everyone’s interest.  In  spectrum, a rogue user may gain a large (albeit temporary) 
advantage by breaking the rules.  The ocean analogy is seductive but very unrealistic. 
 
The current successful implementation of commons spectrum use is Part 15 (unlicensed) 
frequency bands, such as cordless phones, garage door openers, and WiFi.  In this 
restricted frequency space, the FCC has adopted a rule that essentially makes the 
spectrum like the ocean: it imposes a strict power limit on transmitters.  Each transmitter 
then creates interference over such a small geographic area (e.g., the inside of a house) 
that interference is almost defined away.  For these uses, power limits in no significant 
way affect the functionality of the devices, yet the interference problem is solved.  For 
services in which low power destroys functionality (such as airport radars and police 
radio), a commons approach becomes either impossible or costly, and exclusive use is a 
more efficient management approach. 
 
It should also be noted that applications currently deployed in unlicensed spectrum could 
as easily be deployed in licensed spectrum should a market for licenses develop.  For 
example, garage door openers currently operate in Part 15 unlicensed spectrum, a model 
which is quite successful.  However, if licenses were available in regional and national 
markets, firms that produced garage door openers could purchase small frequency bands   - 20-   
(since this is a very narrowband service) throughout the country and design their 
transmitters for their purchased frequency.  Most likely, an industry trade association 
could purchase the spectrum which would then be shared among its members (a form of 
limited commons).  Thus, this service (and others like it) can work equally well under 
either licensed or unlicensed management. 
 
 
Spectrum Management  
 
This term denotes the operating management of specific frequency bands.  For example, 
is the frequency band licensed or unlicensed?  Are there rules governing the use of the 
spectrum (such as use constraints for licensed bands or power limits for unlicensed 
bands)?  Who sets and administers the rules?  Are there social norms among the users 
that control on-air behavior, such as CB radio and ham radio?  Is there a payment for use 
of the band?  If so, to whom?  If licensed, does the licensee exclude other users?  If 
unlicensed, do user groups exclude others? 
 
Under the current regime, both licensed and unlicensed frequency bands are subject to 
rules, beyond the frequency/location/power bundle of rights.  In the case of unlicensed 
bands, these rules may be built into the hardware but they are nevertheless real.  Some 
years ago, cordless phones were available that advertised a “50 mile range.”  While the 
claim was exaggerated, the actual range was far beyond the usual cordless phone range, 
for the simple reason that the phones were emitting power far in excess of that mandated 
by the FCC rules.  These were foreign-made power-boosted phones bootlegged to dealers 
in the US who could sell them as “superphones;” very valuable to their owners but 
causing interference with others.  Alarmingly, these phones caused some interference to 
air traffic control radars.  The same phenomenon occurred in CB radio during its 
popularity peak; it was fairly easy to buy a “souped up” CB radio, or indeed to alter an 
existing radio to illegally boost power.  While beneficial to the owner of the altered radio, 
it greatly increased interference with other CB users. 
 
While early advocates of the commons suggested that commons would be self-managing 
and require no rules imposed by governments or private parties, there is now general 
acceptance that some rules for unlicensed bands are required, although commons 
advocates prefer “light regulation” to accomplish this.
49  There is also the suggestion that 
for some bands, users may well organize themselves, enforcing self-adopted rules 
through non-legal mechanisms.  In fact, this has occurred in the amateur radio band,
50 in 
which a group of dedicated users follow historically adopted practices, and face group 
sanctions should they not follow these practices.  This closely parallels self-policing in 
other well-defined groups of commons users, such as cattle ranchers in the western US 
                                                 
49 See for example, Kevin Werbach, supra note 36, and Ellen Goodman, supra note 3. 
50 Amateur radio is in fact a licensed band; in order to receive a license, a user must pass a test on general 
radio knowledge including demonstrating proficiency in Morse code.  Although Morse code is virtually 
never used in today’s ham radio environment, it acts as a barrier to entry for casual users, resulting in a 
self-defined elite of radio that helps it observe and monitor the group’s adopted rules of behavior.   - 21-   
who use public lands to graze their cattle.
51  Far from being rule-free, such arrangements 
are usually quite complex and even formal.
52 
 
The point here is that there will be rules; the only question is who establishes and 
enforces the rules.  Will the rules be set by a private licensee, by a government regulator 
such as the FCC, or a user/producer group such as ham radio operators or garage door 
opener manufacturers?  While one might speculate that rules set by user groups or 
manufacturers would be more beneficent than rules set by private or regulatory 
controllers, there is no reason to believe this would be the case.  User groups and 
manufacturer groups often have motivations that may not coincide with the well-being of 
the entire group of users or potential users and may be quite inefficient.  For example, 
manufacturers could adopt rules that constitute entry barriers to new competitors, thus 
preserving oligopolistic market power.  This assertion that there will be rules in any 
spectrum now seems to be accepted by both sides to the dispute. 
 
Another issue is the price at which spectrum will be made available.  Early commons 
advocates took their cue from current unlicensed spectrum, in which there is no charge 
for spectrum use.
53  Of course, there is a charge for the devices that use the spectrum, 
such as the cordless phone and the WiFi access point.  Further, there is a cost: since the 
FCC is the current monitor and enforcer of its own standards, it expends resources to 
make the rules and to enforce the rules.  For example, during the CB radio craze of the 
mid-1970s, the FCC was receiving about 35,000-50,000 complaints per year, usually 
from owners of TV sets complaining of broadcast interference.
54  The costs to establish 
the rules and then enforce them could be substantial, and there is no reason to expect that 
taxpayers would continue to bear these costs.  Moreover, there are opportunity costs of 
spectrum use: the Part 15 frequency bands have many alternative uses, such as cellular 
telephony.  Thus, users of unlicensed spectrum are imposing an opportunity cost on the 
economy, even if there is no actual cash flow.  User fees (such as are charged for many 
other public services, such as National Parks) may be a more appropriate way to cover 
these costs. 
 
The point here is that the property rights vs. commons debate is not about price.  
Commons advocates are quick to point out that this is not about “getting free stuff.”  It 
appears the “free/not free” is not really part of this debate. 
 
                                                 
51 See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991), at 15-64, pointing 
out that in a community in which parties have long-term relationships, norms of cooperation can be 
enforced by reputation building. If parties are unknown to each other, or otherwise anonymous, then the 
incentive of each party is to be selfish short-run profit-maximizer, as reputation sanctions are ineffective. 
52 There do exist examples of pure commons in which there are no rules.  For example, public domain 
literature can be published by anyone without payment of royalties or any other restriction.  In this case, the 
use of a book or article in the public domain does no damage to any other party, so untrammeled access is 
efficient. 
53 This is not quite true; some retail establishments that offer WiFi service on their premises often require a 
fee for usage. 
54 George Dillon, FCC Enforcement Bureau, private conversation, January 8, 2004.   - 22-   
The core of the case for commons seems to be open access to all.  Commons advocates 
assert that exclusive use licensing will necessarily lead to, well, exclusion.  Only 
licensees will have access to the licensed band, and others will be excluded.  In a 
commons, everyone will have access.  Yes, there will be rules, and there may even be a 
price, but open access to all is the touchstone of the commons argument. 
 
Is it true that commons always implies open access?  As a general rule, not all commons 
are necessarily open to all.  For example, cattle grazing on “open” public lands is often 
quite limited by rules.  A non member will generally not be able to drive up with five 
head of cattle to let them graze on such lands, as it constitutes a limited commons.  But it 
is certainly the case that Part 15 use of the 2.4 Ghz band for WiFi is indeed open to all, 
and this is what commons advocates have in mind. 
 
Is it true that exclusive use licenses necessarily lead to a closed system?  There are cases 
in which this is true; an airport operating a radar system will not share its spectrum with 
anyone else, nor will an FM radio station.  However, much spectrum held by licensees is 
actively marketed by those licensees in order to attract as many users as possible.  
Consider, for example, cellular telephony.  Each wireless carrier offers to provide service 
to anyone; no one is refused (although billing arrangements may vary).  Carriers offer 
flexibility regarding handsets; a check of Verizon Wireless’ website revealed the firm 
offering twenty different handsets from seven different manufacturers, with a wide 
variety of features and functions.  It is hard to imagine access more open.
55 
 
But the commons advocates look to the Internet’s “end-to-end” principle,
56 in which 
anyone may launch any application they wish on the Internet.
57  But this is not observed 
in radio; any device intended for use in the spectrum must either be controlled by a 
licensed user or be type-certified by the FCC.
58  This is not simply a meddling regulator; 
devices which do not meet standards may well cause harm to other users.  Approval of 
devices is the norm in unlicensed bands.  In the PCS cellular band, the licensee 
determines what devices it approves.  This is a bit more restrictive (and a great deal more 
efficient) than type-certification; but it is difficult to build a case for open access in 
unlicensed as compared to licensed based on this small difference. 
 
                                                 
55 Note that if “open access” is indeed the same as “anyone can use it”, then this is simply common 
carriage, a principle that has been used in telecommunications and utility regulation for over a century, 
hardly a revolutionary development. 
56 See  J. H. Saltzer, D. P. Reed, and D. D. Clark. End-to-end arguments in system design. ACM 
Transactions on Computer Systems, 277 (1984) at <http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/saltzer84endtoend.htm> 
57 If the application doesn’t use the existing protocols of TCP/IP it will not work, and will do no one any 
harm.  If a new wireless application doesn’t use the existing rules and protocols, it may work and it is likely 
to cause others harm, through interference.  The Internet is not like wireless in this regard. 
   In fact, the very openness of the Internet has led to its own “tragedy of the commons.”  The ability of 
anyone to develop an application and distribute it over the Internet becomes much less wonderful when that 
application is a virus or worm that can infect computers worldwide in hours or minutes.  The anonymity of 
the Internet becomes less wonderful when that anonymity (plus low cost distribution) fills users’ mailboxes 
daily with hundreds of spam e-mails.  The great promise of the Internet is in danger of being undermined 
by these activities, but they are a product of its openness; it is a tragedy of the commons. 
58 Even experimenters must acquire an experimenter’s license in order to transmit and experimental device.   - 23-   
In fact, current PCS cellular services are quite close to what the FCC has termed “private 
commons”
59, privately licensed spectrum made available to all (under conditions 
determined by the licensee).  The only difference is that the FCC envisions that the 
licensee would not provide infrastructure, using instead a low-power mesh network 
architecture.  But the openness and availability of diverse technologies appears the same.  
The only difference appears to be whether the system infrastructure is contained within 
the user device or not. 
 
To summarize: there seems to be general agreement that both licensed and unlicensed 
spectrum will be subject to rules.  In unlicensed bands, the FCC (and possibly device 
manufacturers) will set the rules; in licensed bands, the licensee will set the rules.  The 
issue is not whether there will be rules or not; the issue will be who sets the rules.  
Additionally, it is likely that both licensed and unlicensed frequency bands will carry a 
price, unless explicitly subsidized by the government.
 60  The role of open access, 
strongly emphasized by commons advocates, may actually be well-served in certain 
licensed bands such as cellular telephone, for the simple reason that licensees find it most 
profitable to offer services to everyone on similar terms and conditions, although this 
latter point may be more controversial. 
 
Are there differences in management between property rights/licensed and 
commons/unlicensed?  In fact, the differences are rather profound.  In the licensed arena, 
both private and public agents may hold licenses.  For example, police departments, the 
military, and Federal Aviation Agency air traffic control may hold licenses, as well as TV 
and radio broadcaster, cellular telephone firms, and cable TV firms.  The licensee may 
use its license exclusively; for example cable TV network providers use satellite radio 
channels to transmit TV shows in real time (or on delay) to their various franchisees.  
Broadcast networks also use satellite channels to distribute material to affiliates.  They 
use these channels continuously; and have no interest in sharing.  Likewise, air traffic 
control is not interested in sharing its frequencies.  But licensees could also open their 
spectrum to everyone, such as occurs in cellular, or to some subset of users, such as 
aeronautical radio (in which only members can use the spectrum).  Government 
licensees
61 can choose to open their spectrum to all, such as Part 15, or to some, such as 
                                                 
59 See FCC 04-167, Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to Secondary 
Markets,  Second Report and Order, September 2, 2004, at 47ff. 
60 See Frischmann , Brett M., "An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Sustainable Infrastructure 
Commons" . Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 89, April 2005 at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=588424>,  at 925: “This does not 
mean access is free. We pay tolls to access highways, we buy stamps to send letters, we pay telephone 
companies to have our calls routed across their lines, and so on. Users must pay for access to some (though 
not all) of these resources. Nor does it mean that access to the resource is unregulated. Transportation of 
hazardous substances by highway or mail, for example, is heavily regulated. The key point is that the 
resource is openly accessible to all within a community regardless of who you are and how you are using 
the resource; accessibility generally does not turn on the identity of the end-user or end-use.”  But as noted 
above, this is simply common carriage, not a “commons.” 
61 Under the current regime, the government doesn’t actually hold a license to Part 15 spectrum.  But if a 
property rights regime were in place, the government (in fact, state and local governments as well as the 
Federal government) would hold licenses to any spectrum offered under Part 15 rules.  In essence, the 
government would “own” the commons, much as it owns public lands today.   - 24-   
ham radio operators.  Thus, a  property rights regime could accommodate both private 
and public ownership of licenses and could accommodate exclusive use and various 
forms of open access spectrum, including government-managed commons. 
 
A  commons regime, however, has virtually no other management option than … 
commons.  Exclusive use is not possible, nor is private licensing.  A commons regime is 
forevermore government controlled and non-exclusive.  As a result, spectrum devoted to 
property rights/licensed has a rich set of management options available, including 
government-owned and managed commons.
62  Spectrum devoted to commons has only 
one management option: commons, subject to regulatory oversight.  On the management 
flexibility dimension, a property rights regime has a decided advantage.  This suggests 
that some form of licensing will be with us for the indefinite future. 
 
Overarching Legal Regime  
 
Moving from the micro view to the macro view, I examine the core of the dispute: the 
overarching legal regime which governs spectrum.  The analysis thus far suggests four 
possible legal regimes: (i) traditional command-and-control regulation; (ii) end-state 
regulation, as described above;
63 (iii) a property rights regime; and (iv) a commons 
regime. 
 
Since (i) is the regime from which all reformers, both academic and practical, flee, it can 
be removed from further consideration.  Today’s regime is far enough away from 
traditional regulation that a reversion to it is not a serious policy option.  The commons 
regime, while attractive to some, is lacking in flexibility that virtually all disputants agree 
is necessary.  If the overarching legal regime is a commons, then there is no management 
option for exclusive use, either public or private; since many uses are most efficiently 
deployed using exclusive use, a commons regime must also be removed from 
consideration. 
 
The two serious contending regimes are a property rights regime and an end-state 
regulatory regime.  The two regimes are compared on four dimensions: (a) dispute 
resolution; (b) transactions costs; (c) the tragedies of the commons and anticommons; and 
(d).flexibility to adapt to changing technology and changing demands. These 
comparisons are made using simplifying assumptions: (i) transition issues are ignored; 
the regimes are assumed to be in long run equilibrium; and (ii) the technologies discussed 
above
64 are assumed to by fully mature and available in the market at reasonable cost.  
This is not to say that transitions, both economic and political, are not important; we 
                                                 
62 To be perfectly clear, under a  property rights/licensed regime, a government (at any level, or any other 
entity) can own a swath of spectrum and permit others to use it, subject to their rules and regulations.  For 
example, New York City land is governed by a property rights regime, and yet there is a large and 
important commons in the middle of Manhattan: Central Park.  The presence of Central Park in no way 
compromises the property rights regime governing real estate in New York; the City of New York owns the 
park and chooses to manage it as a commons available to all, under their rules and regulations.  It is in this 
sense that a  property rights regime can accommodate commons usage. 
63 Supra at 3. 
64 supra at 3-3.   - 25-   
applaud the extensive work at the FCC focused on transition.
65  This is also not to say 
that the technologies described above as yet-to-be-deployed are guaranteed of success; 
but assuming their success makes the case for a commons (and for a non-interfering 
easement) rather stronger.  These caveats are extremely important.  It could be that the 
transition to a preferred regime is very costly or politically impossible; in which case we 
must settled for second-best.  In this paper, I take the view that it is important to 
understand what the preferred target regime is, and why it is preferred, so that an 
informed decision regarding transition and its costs can be made. 
 
The actual mechanics of how legal regimes work is messy and uncertain.  While property 
rights advocates assume that the costs of a property rights system (dispute resolution, 
transactions costs, etc.) are low to nil, such need not be the case; cost must be identified 
and estimated.  Likewise, commons advocates assume that if commons are not totally 
self-regulating then “light” regulation will solve the problem, all at low cost.  Again, this 
is surely not the case; the costs must be identified and estimated. 
 
 
Regime Change -- Finding the Answer 
 
In order to assess which regime will lead to more efficient use of spectrum, we examine 
each of the four issues: dispute resolution, transactions costs, tragedies of the commons 
and anticommons, and flexibility to changing technologies and demands.  This requires 
that the properties of both regulation and markets be made explicit, so that a comparison 
on these four dimensions is possible. 
 
 
Property Rights vs. End-State Regulation: What’s the Difference? 
 
A brief statement of the differences between the two candidate regimes is in order prior 
to a comparison of their characteristics. 
 
Property Rights: specific rights governing transmission of radio energy and freedom 
from impinging radiation are defined for each frequency band and geographic area, and 
licenses are owned by either private individuals or firms, or by public agencies.  The 
licensee has the right to operate radio systems within the constraints imposed by the 
license; she may buy additional licenses, sell the license, subdivide the license, and 
rent/lease all or part of the license.  A licensee may use the licensed spectrum for its 
exclusive use; it may use the spectrum to offer services involving other parties 
(customers) either with or without charge.  Such uses include commons-type open access.  
If a licensee’s spectrum is available to others, such as a cellular phone system or a WiFi-
type home networking system, the licensee (public or private) may establish whatever 
rules, regulations, and obligations on users it deems fit, within the overall constraints of 
its license. In this regime, behavior within the bounds of a license is governed by the 
                                                 
65 See Evan Kwerel and John Williams, A Proposal for Rapid Transition to Market Allocation of Spectrum, 
Federal Communications Commission OPP Working Paper #38, at  
<http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-228552A1.pdf>   - 26-   
licensee, be it private, corporate, or governmental.  Behavior among licenses is governed 
by the market, supported by the courts for dispute resolution. 
 
End-State Regulation: specific rights governing transmission of radio energy and 
freedom from impinging radiation are defined for each frequency band and geographic 
area, and the regulator (say, the FCC) specifies which bands and areas are to be licensed 
and which bands are held in common as unlicensed.  Changes in the allocation between 
licensed and unlicensed would also be under the control of the FCC.  Licenses are owned 
by licensees and can be bought, sold, subdivided, aggregated, and leased by licensees.  
However, disputes among licensees would continue to be resolved, as today, by the 
regulator.  The FCC would be able (but not likely) modify the terms of licenses or even 
revoke them.  Frequency bands held in common would be individually managed by the 
FCC, and may differ in operating characteristics permitted and may be limited in who 
may use these bands and/or what uses are permitted in the bands.  Disputes among users 
of the commons would be resolved, as today, by the regulator.  Further, selection of 
protocols and formats to be used to avoid interference would be decided by the FCC, as 
today.  The FCC would also control the boundaries among commons uses as well as 
between commons and licensed uses.  The FCC would be able (but not likely) to impose 
use restrictions for either licensed or unlicensed bands.  In this regime, the FCC would 
have much the same power as today to designate frequency bands as licensed or 
unlicensed, change these allocations over time, resolve disputes in both licensed and 
unlicensed, and set the rules and obligations for commons/unlicensed spectrum.  The only 
difference with today’s regime is that licensees would have much greater freedom to buy, 
sell, subdivide, aggregate and lease their licenses.  In all other respects, regulatory 
authority would remain in place. 
 
In brief, the critical difference is the role of regulation.  In the  property rights regime, 
regulation is largely replaced by careful construction of property rights to avoid 
interference, operation of the market, and support of the judiciary for dispute resolution.  
Today’s regulators are relegated to setting rules and regulations only in frequency bands 
for which they are the licensees, and their power is no more than that of any other 
licensee.  In the end-state regulation regime, the regulator continues its overarching role 
of allocator of frequencies, arbiter of protocol and technology choices, and adjudicator of 
disputes, as today.  The regime does offer licensees much greater freedom to use the 
market to buy, sell, and lease their licenses, which of course would still be subject to 
ultimate regulatory control. 
 
A Short Course in The Theory and Practice of Regulation  
 
Because regulation is the defining characteristic of the end-state regulation regime, an 
understanding of regulation
66 is required.  Is “light regulation” even possible?  I argue 
                                                 
66 I use the term “regulation” to denote the presence of a permanent governmental body that has been 
delegated authority to establish and enforce rules concerning core economic decisions of firms in specific 
markets or market activities, including price, quality, standards, entry and exit, and other such rules and 
obligations.  In this context, I do not consider the courts to be involved in regulation.   - 27-   
that “light regulation” is an oxymoron; it is not an equilibrium outcome of the political 
forces that drive regulators, especially in commercially important markets. 
 
And regulation is above all political, subject to forces of producers large and small, 
consumer and user groups, unions, the US Congress, even economists and technologists.  
If a regulator has jurisdiction over particular markets and technologies, it has the potential 
to use the coercive power of the government to intervene in markets.  This power is 
highly valued by market participants, and they will lobby the regulator to intervene on 
their behalf, at the expense of their competitors.  Such lobbying is not only targeted at the 
regulators, it is also targeted at legislators (either state or Federal) that control the 
regulators budgets and can enact laws overturning regulatory rulings.  The regulatory 
process is designed to listen to all sides, consider carefully the merits as well as the power 
of the lobbying participants and the likelihood of a successful court challenge, and reach 
a conclusion, often after years of comment, reply comment, deliberation and 
reconsideration.  Participants use the regulatory/political/judicial process strategically to 
achieve corporate or group objectives.  As an example, consider the ongoing FCC case of 
Nextel Communications, a cellular (SMR licensed) carrier operating in the 800 Mhz 
band.  This band is adjacent to a police radio band, and police around the nation were 
claiming interference from cellular traffic in the Nextel band.  Nextel proposed that it 
would move to another band to avoid interference, and the FCC appeared to agree.  This 
rather simple transaction would appear straightforward; however, the proceeding has 
been ongoing for the last two years, and has attracted 2,445 comments and reply 
comments from parties far beyond the 800 Mhz band.  Most instructive was Verizon 
Wireless’ demand that Nextel should be forced to bid for the spectrum at auction (even 
though it had already paid for its 800 Mhz spectrum it was now being forced to 
abandon
67).  Verizon Wireless, a competitor to Nextel, was pursuing the interests of its 
shareowners in its use of the regulatory process to disadvantage a competitor; it is 
blameless here.  Rather, the problem lies with the regulatory process, which permits 
parties outside the transaction (which after all is between Nextel and public safety 
agencies) to have an influence over the outcome.  This interpretation of Verizon 
Wireless’ actions is supported by the fact that it reached a business agreement
68 with 
Nextel to drop all lawsuits if Nextel agreed to let Verizon Wireless use its successful 
copyrighted “push-to-talk” label for its own services.
69  In sum, it was profit maximal for 
Verizon Wireless to use its lobbying abilities in a dispute in which it had no direct 
interest to gain a commercial advantage. 
 
But surely, it might be thought, instructing the FCC (or whatever regulator there is) to 
regulate “lightly” would eliminate these problems.  Unfortunately, this is not the case.  
                                                 
67 It might be argued that Nextel could sell its interest in the 800 Mhz band in order to buy other spectrum 
at auction.  In fact, Nextel had paid for its spectrum in every expectation it could use it.  In the event, it was 
the collective ability of the nation’s police forces to lobby to shut down Nextel made this spectrum 
valueless; should Nextel have tried to sell it, it would have no takers since the spectrum is now unusable for 
high powered SMR applications. 
68 See Ken Belson, Verizon and Nextel Agree to Drop Lawsuits, New York Times, C12 (Nov 3, 2004), at < 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10715F734590C708CDDA80994DC404482&incamp=arc
hive:search> 
69 After Verizon Wireless dropped its objections, the FCC approved Nextel’s rebanding plan.   - 28-   
Market participants who can successfully lobby the regulator or Congress will do 
everything they can to force a regulator to intervene in their markets because the 
participants can then use their power to achieve market outcomes favorable to 
themselves, generally at lower cost than actually serving customers.  It is the participants 
who will force the regulator to expand from light regulation to the usual pervasive 
regulation, often by enlisting Congressional support.  This is why “light regulation” is an 
oxymoron; as long as a regulator of a market exists, participants will push the regulator to 
expand its writ so that participants can enjoy the market advantage that comes from 
successful lobbying.  The conclusion is clear: light regulation is not a real option.
70 
 
There are some frequency bands in which the FCC’s hand has been very light; garage 
door openers and outside home weather stations, for example.  But there were very 
substantial disputes over the introduction of spread spectrum technology in cordless 
phones, for example; it appears that if the market does not involve a great amount of 
market value and there are no technological changes involves, then minimal regulation 
may emerge. 
 
Generally, there is no reason to suspect that regulation under the end-state regulation 
regime will be much different than it is today, except licenses will be much easier to 
transact under this regime.  But the same forces operating in today’s regulated 
environment will continue to operate in the end-state regulation regime and will be 
mediated in much the same way.  In sum, as long as there is a regulator to complain to, 
market participants will complain and the regulator will be forced to respond.  The scope 
and intensity of regulation inevitably expands to meet the demands of market 
participants. 
 
Could some form of regulation be used in a property rights regime as a specialized court 
for dispute resolution?  If expertise in wireless issues is needed, perhaps retaining 
regulation for dispute resolution makes some sense.  But as we have just seen, dispute 
resolution is a function in which regulation performs particularly poorly, and becomes a 
backdoor by which regulation re-enters, as market participants manipulate their actions to 
accord with the regulator’s interests as expressed in dispute resolution cases.  In fact, the 
need for technical expertise by courts or regulators to enforce property rights is a signal 
that the property rights are too complex and too complicated for normal people to 
understand.  The problem is solved, not through specialized courts or regulators, but via 
simple, clear, measurable conditions on spectrum licenses. 
 
As inefficient as regulation can be, is it necessarily worse than a market system which 
uses the judiciary for dispute resolution?  Clearly, the disastrous consequences of 
asbestos litigation suggest that there may be worse things than regulation.  But a simple 
                                                 
70 If light regulation were a feasible option, one would expect that it would exist in some jurisdiction in 
some industry.  The commons advocates have yet to disclose the existence of light regulation in the real 
world in markets where substantial value is at stake.  Perhaps the most telling evidence is that the most 
successful US deregulations (airlines and motor freight) were very quickly followed by the abolition of the 
regulating agencies (Civil Aeronautics Board and Interstate Commerce Commission).  Had these agencies 
survived, there is little doubt that market participants would have figured out a way to get them to resume 
their regulating ways.   - 29-   
comparison of long-run outcomes should frame the issue: spectrum has been allocated by 
regulation for over seventy years and very large swaths of frequencies are not in use, 
even though the demand for spectrum is quite high.  Land, on the other hand, has been 
allocated by the market via property rights with dispute resolution by the courts for 
centuries, and yet we do not see large swaths of real property lying empty and unused in 
presence of high demand for it.  Likewise, dispute resolution of commercial disputes via 
commercial law, while costly, have not resulted in large swaths of the economy being 
paralyzed by allocative inefficiencies.  This simple efficiency test suggests that the costs 
of regulation really are significantly higher than market mechanisms for allocating 
resources. 
 
Dispute Resolution  
 
Disputes take several forms.  A classic dispute over a specific interference problem was 
described above in the case of Nextel in the 800 Mhz spectrum.  Another form of dispute 
could be the introduction of a new technology, such as wideband.  A third form of dispute 
could be over standards and protocols, in which one or more parties wish to change an 




It is easy to assess how an end-state regulatory regime will handle disputes; it will handle 
them pretty much as it does today.  The Nextel 800 Mhz dispute was discussed above; 
this is a case involving licensed spectrum.  Unless the end-state regulatory regime 
explicitly moves to court-enforced property rights for the spectrum under licensed 
management, we can expect the FCC to continue to resolve disputes between licensees in 
much the same was as the Nextel 800 Mhz dispute was resolved. 
 
In the case of unlicensed spectrum, the FCC regulatory process has also established a 
track record relating to new technology introduction.  This is particularly important to the 
commons argument, since the FCC cannot step back from dispute resolution in 
unlicensed spectrum in the end-state regulatory regime.  In her excellent article, Ellen 
Goodman notes: “For example, it took three years and two rulemakings for the FCC to 
change its ex ante controls for unlicensed operation to allow new, nonconforming 
technologies into the unlicensed bands.”
72 The footnote that follows explicates this long 
drawn out affair of regulatory cut and thrust involving the introduction of a new 
technology into a commons regime.  It would appear that even in commons-managed 
spectrum, the regulatory process is not particularly friendly to new technology 
introduction.  But in the future commons, this scenario will no doubt be the norm; again, 
“light regulation” is an oxymoron. 
                                                 
71 Werbach (supra note 34) argues that dispute resolution in his “supercommons” will occur via some form 
of tort which he does not completely specify.  Given that a regulator would continue to have overarching 
authority of all spectrum, both licensed and unlicensed, it is very unlikely that the locus of dispute 
resolution will change.  The FCC will continue to resolve disputes, using rules rather similar to those in 
place today.  Since the regulatory process is very unlikely to change, it is safe to assume that at least in 
unlicensed bands the FCC will continue to resolve disputes. 
72 Goodman, supra note 3, at 376.   - 30-   
 
Several commons advocates have suggested that social norms can develop within 
communities to ensure that individuals behave cooperatively (i.e., no pirate transmitting 
devices) or be subject to group sanctions.
73  The reference is Robert Ellickson’s famously 
colorful study of ranchers in Shasta County, CA,
74 based on the theory of repeated 
games, which suggested that norms of cooperation (such as the “tit for tat” strategy) can 
emerge within stable communities.  But Ellickson makes clear that this only occurs 
within stable communities in which actions among neighbors are seen as part of a pattern 
of repeated play, where sanctions for uncooperative behavior can be imposed on future 
stages of play.  In the wireless context, this applies to cooperation standards among ham 
radio operators, a fairly homogeneous group who know who is who in the ham 
community.  It doesn’t apply in mass markets such as CB radio in the 1970s, where 
players are anonymous and cannot be disciplined by other users. 
 
But even when there are user communities that interact over long time periods, 
Ellickson’s view regarding the likelihood of cooperation, based on Axelrod’s work in the 
early 1980s,
75 is overly rosy.  Later work in sequential game theory proves Ellickson’s 
allegations about the likelihood of cooperation are incorrect on several counts: (i) “tit for 
tat” is not an equilibrium strategy
76 in the repeated play prisoner’s dilemma game; (ii) 
while cooperative equilibria do exist,
77 they are not unique; non-cooperative equilibria 
also exist.  Evolutionary game theory suggests that if the cooperative equilibria require 
investments, then it is likely that they will be unstable compared to non-cooperative 
equilibria.
78  Commons advocates have used Ellickson and the ensuing legal literature
79 
on norms to suggest that social norms and mores can act as a substitute for regulation.    
But the more careful application of game theory by Mahoney and Sanchirico proves this 
bias toward cooperative norms is misplaced;
80 we rely on it at our peril.  Moreover, in a 
commons regime, the number of “neighbors” is likely to be large and their relationship is 
unlikely to be long term, so cooperative equilibria are unlikely to exist. Realistically, in 
commons or markets, court-enforced law or regulation is a necessity whenever cheating 
could be short-term profitable.  Reliance on social norms is romantic but fanciful. 
                                                 
73 Benkler, supra note 3 at 287,361; also Dale Hatfield and Philip Weiser, Policing the Spectrum Commons, 
at 11. 
74 Ellickson, supra note 51. 
75 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution Of Cooperation Basic Books (1984).  Much of this work is based on 
articles the author published in 1980-81, very early days in the development of modern game theory. 
76 The correct equilibrium concept for sequential games is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.  Such 
equilibria ensure that sanctions are optimal for other players to impose on strategy deviants, thus ensuring 
strategic discipline that supports the equilibrium.  See Paul Mahoney and Chris Sanchirico, Norms, 
Repeated Games, and the Role for Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1281 (2003) for a lucid explanation in the legal 
scholarship literature. 
77 Mahoney and Sanchirico, supra. 
78 Paul Mahoney and Chris Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm 
Efficient?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2027 (2001). 
79 For example, Eric Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on 
Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. (1996) and Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and 
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 352 (1997). 
80 The evolutionary psychology literature suggests a non-game-theoretic mechanism in which cooperation 
is a possible equilibrium; see Amy Wax, Evolution and the Bounds of Human Nature, 23 Law and 
Philosophy, 527 (2004).   - 31-   
 
But surely in practice industry groups would find it in their interest to cooperate?  
Unfortunately, this is not the case. Goodman continues: “Even when industry groups are 
responsible for agreeing to protocols that the regulator merely approves, standard setting 
has often proved to be staggeringly slow and acrimonious.”
81 The footnote that follows 
explicates the lengthy proceedings involved in setting standards for digital television. 
 
Unfortunately, the commons presents a special difficulty in dispute resolution.  In a 
property rights regime, each licensee has only a few neighbors, those that would be most 
affected by a violation of the license terms and conditions.  In a commons regime, there 
could well be thousands of users of a particular commons.  If a particular user decides to 
“cheat,” perhaps using an illegal transmitter with much higher power than permitted in 
the commons, this will interfere with other users.  However, since the interference 
impinges on many users, there will be a free rider problem with enforcement.  Who will 
bother to file a formal complaint to the FCC, when everyone expects someone else to 
undertake the costly complaint process?  If commons users are given the right to sue the 
interferer, the problem becomes even worse.
82  Who will bring a costly suit against the 
interferer when everyone expects someone else to bring the suit?  This is the enforcement 
tragedy of the commons; with lots of commons users affected by the interference, no one 
user has an incentive to enforce their commons rights.   
 
In a  property rights regime, the specification of the property rights becomes critical.  
Following De Vany
83, I assume that as a minimum each license has a location, a 
frequency band, and power levels specified; additionally a license could also be limited 
by time of day or direction (relevant for satellite reception, e.g.).  It is useful to think of 
both location and frequency as an allotted space in which the licensee’s power across the 
boundaries of this space are explicitly restricted.
84  For example, power emissions into 
adjacent frequency bands would be specified,
85 and power emissions across a geographic 
boundary would also be specified (in watts/m
2).
86    In both cases, the power limits may 
be expressed statistically: emissions across a geographic boundary should be no greater 
than x watts/m
2 no more than y% of the time.
87  These restrictions on transmitting in one 
frequency band and location become rights for those in adjacent frequency bands and 
locations.  Goodman argues persuasively that the use of nuisance law to resolve spectrum 
property disputes would be costly and inefficient.
88  Therefore, I propose that license 
                                                 
81 Goodman, supra note 3, at 377. 
82 As suggested by Werbach, supra at 82. 
83 De Vany, supra note 8. 
84 A full discussion of flexible license rights is contained in Kwerel and Williams, supra, at 42, Appendix: 
Spectrum Rights and Interference Control Under a Flexible Licensing Regime. 
85 This limitation could be specified to “roll off,” so that e.g., 80% of out of band emissions would be 
within 0.5 Khz of the frequency band border, 95% must be within 1.0 Khz of the border, etc. 
86 It is more convenient to express power limitations at the transmitter; however, it is actual power 
impinging across a geographic boundary that is the relevant measure for interference in an adjacent 
location. 
87 This specification may also include the height of the measuring antenna: e.g., “…no greater than x 
watts/m
2 no more than y% of the time measured no higher than z m above ground.”  Clearly, effective 
enforcement requires the right to be fully specified, cover (almost) all contingencies, and be measurable. 
88 Goodman, supra note 3, at 326-359.  Nuisance law cases require a determination of damages as well as a   - 32-   
restrictions would have the force of trespass law; should a licensee violate one of its 
restrictions, its neighbors could obtain injunctive relief without a showing of damages.  
Could these restrictions be enforced by neighbors?  Should a licensee detect interference, 
either it or a third-party measurement service could objectively measure and record 
violations.  In fact, it may make such measurements routinely, without waiting for 
allegations of interference violations.  The “bright line” trespass rule together with the 
ease of measuring violations suggests that courts would find dispute resolution 
straightforward: technical evidence of violation is presented, no damages need to be 
proved, no balancing of interests is required, and an injunction follows.
8990  In fact, in 
such a trespass law regime, few cases would ever reach the court, since the outcome 
would be foreordained.  Only case with questionable evidence would move forward.  
Thus, simple dispute resolution should be a relatively low cost.  This avoids Goodman’s 
costly nuisance law issues. 
 
But not all interference cases result from license condition violations.  Radio waves can 
do unexpected things and more sophisticated forms of interference may occur, although 
this should be unusual.  In these cases, in which a licensee experiences interference from 
another licensee who is operating within his property rights, several alternatives are 
possible.  (i) “Neighborly” bargaining.  As the commons advocates point out, neighbors 
often figure out means of resolving disputes without recourse to the courts, especially in 
the presence of long term relationships (“repeated play” in game theoretic language).  But 
neighborly interaction works in a property rights regime as well as a commons regime, 
perhaps even better because there are likely to be fewer (and more familiar) neighbors.  
Such could be the case here, and in cases where such interference occurs, neighborly 
bargaining is likely to be the first line of dispute resolution.  A second option is more 
formal dispute resolution, including the courts (in the form of nuisance law) or 
arbitration.  In fact, binding arbitration should be considered an option, should this prove 
to be the most efficient dispute resolution of these spectrum nuisance cases.  Since these 
cases are likely to require specialized knowledge of radio technology, specialist 
arbitrators are likely to be knowledgeable and effective as against generalist judges and 
juries.
91 
                                                                                                                                                 
balancing of interests among the parties.  This is the basis of Goodman’s finding that nuisance law imposes 
substantial inefficiencies. 
89 No doubt a court would be loath to issue an injunction if a licensee emitted out of band power 1% over 
its permitted limit for 1 second, without a showing of damages.  If the property right were written 
specifically acknowledging the right of injunctive relief without a showing of damages, it is likely the 
courts would settle on a threshold level of intrusion that would call forth an injunction. 
90 The way boundary rights are defined now in flexible licenses does not require measurements nor the 
existence of "interference" per se.  They are enforced either by equipment type acceptance or by 
calculations using standard propagation models and technical data that licensees must provide. Also, 
violations of current boundary limits (like trespass on land) are enforceable now even if there is no harm 
from interference to a licensee's services.  John Williams, Federal Communications Commission, private 
communication. 
91 Whether or not arbitration is more efficient than litigation or is more or less fair is a matter of dispute 
within the legal scholarship literature, which is not addressed in this paper.  See Lisa B. Bingham, Control 
Over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, 67-SPG Law & Contemp. Probs. 
221 (2004) for a discussion of the issues.  The fairness of arbitration in employee-employer disputes is 
discussed in Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. Rev. 105   - 33-   
 
Failing neighborly bargaining and the courts (or arbitration), an aggrieved licensee has 
the option of selling his license and moving elsewhere.  Now should this be suggested for 
the settling of land disputes, this would clearly be inappropriate, as landowners may have 
strong emotional attachments to their homestead or large capital investments that are 
specific to this property.  In spectrum, it is not likely that any licensee will have strong 
emotional attachments to their spectrum.  But how about capital investments?  Surely 
investing in transmitter and receivers (which may actually be owned by your customers) 
at a certain frequency band makes moving to a different band very costly.  However, in 
the new world of software-defined radio (which we assume to be fully mature) frequency 
changes in a transmitter can be made quite simply with a flip of a software switch.  A 
frequency changes in customer-owned equipment is easily updated over the air in a 
software-defined radio world.  Even today, cellular telephones receive software updates 
over the air, patching themselves remotely.  In this future technological environment, 
transmitters and receivers will have no long term attachments to particular frequency 
bands and moving from one to another should be easy.
92,93  If a licensee has insuperable 
problems with its neighbor, it can simply move away at low cost to a new set of 
neighbors.
94  With a rich market in licenses, finding a new place to locate should be no 
more difficult than finding a new house or apartment.  The problem of the anticommons 
simply does not arise. 
 
If non-interfering easements are granted within the property rights model, the same 
principle applies.  For example, an opportunistic agile radio would have the right to 
broadcast in a licensed band if the licensee is not using it; the agile radio has the 
obligation to ascertain if it is being used before broadcasting.
95  The agile radio would 
also be required to vacate the band within (say) 5 milliseconds of the licensee starting use 
of the band.  Failure of the agile radio to comply would be a trespass violation, and an 
injunction issued against this particular agile radio using this band again.  In this special 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2003) at 115, in which empirical results are quoted, “…compare[ing] the size of the awards in AAA 
arbitration proceedings to the size of awards in state court employment cases. The median AAA award was 
$63,120, while the median state court award was an almost identical $68,737.”  The mean of court awards 
was considerably higher than the mean of arbitration awards, suggesting that occasional very high jury 
awards lent a certain lottery aspect to litigation for plaintiffs not present in arbitration. 
92 Note that the ability of licensees to swap spectrum using markets is far less demanding than the 
technology of agile radio, in which spectrum may be swapped every few seconds rather than every few 
years. 
93 A user interested in switching frequency bands will of course be limited in her choices to bands whose 
license property rights match their needs; not all bands will necessarily do. 
94 It is possible that the licensee may incur a loss in selling her current license, if it were the case that her 
interference troubles with neighbors would carry over to the next owner.  For example, if a homeowner 
acquires a new neighbor that is noisy and obnoxious (but not illegally so), she can move, but it is likely the 
price of her home will reflect the negative aspects of her current neighbor. 
95 Quite recently, the FCC issued a ruling permitting “smart” (i.e., agile) radios, taking care to ensure that 
such radios do not interfere with licensees use of spectrum.  See FCC ADOPTS RULE CHANGES FOR 
SMART RADIOS, ET Docket 03-108, March 10, 2005, at 
<http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-257310A1.pdf>. 
  FCC Protest Spectrum from Software Radio, eWeek March 11, 2005 at 
<http://www.extremetech.com/article2/0,1558,1775172,00.asp?kc=ETRSS02129TX1K0000532>   - 34-   
case of opportunistic use of licensed spectrum, agile radios would be required to 
broadcast an identifying number to ensure that violators can be identified.
96 
 
Dispute resolution costs in a property rights model are thus held low by (i) using trespass 
law to enforce licensee restrictions; (ii) using neighborly bargaining where possible; (iii) 
using nuisance law in litigation or arbitration as a backup; and (iv) if all else fails, 
relocate at low cost. 
 
Transactions Costs  
 
Commons advocates point out that markets for licenses have costs: buying and selling a 
license involves costs which would not be incurred in a commons regime.  Both 
Benkler
97 and Werbach
98 note that transactions cost in a property regime are likely to be 
large and thus suggest the rejection of a market-based property rights regime for that 
reason (among many others).  While neither author offers evidence of large transaction 
costs, nor do they even define “large.” 
 
In the recent past, spectrum transactions have been difficult to execute because of 
regulatory limitations, and so have been more costly than would be the case in a full 
property rights market.  Even so, a great many transactions occurred; Nextel, for 
example, purchased over 40,000 SMR licenses to put together its national network, 
apparently not overwhelmed by transactions costs.
99  A number of large wireless firms 
bought, sold and swapped spectrum around the country in order to build their national 
networks, again apparently not overwhelmed by transactions costs,
100 in spite of the 
difficulty of transacting an FCC license.  The empirical evidence suggests that the 
transactions costs of spectrum in the late 1990s did not prevent a very active market in 
spectrum licenses, even though these costs are greater than would be expected in a full 
property rights market. 
 
There does not appear to be publicly available data on the pecuniary costs of transacting 
spectrum licenses.  However, the costs can be easily bounded from above and below.  For 
example, Internet stock brokerage services are willing to trade at $10-13 per trade 
brokerage commission.
101  Of course, the stock market has very high volume and very 
competitive brokerage services, so this commission is likely a lower bound.  The market 
is more likely to be similar to the real estate market in terms of volume and transaction 
speed.  Generally, the real estate market has very high transactions costs, so is useful as 
an upper bound on spectrum license costs.  Typically, brokerage commissions are 5%-
6%.  Based on a sample of forty real estate transactions in Maryland and Delaware, I 
                                                 
96 Should such services become popular, then they may acquire “squatters rights;” even though they 
infringe on licensees, it may be difficult if not impossible to evict them. 
97 Supra note 3 at 57. 
98 Supra note 31 at 419. 
99 See Thomas Hazlett, Is Federal Preemption Efficient In Cellular Phone Regulation?  56 Fed. Comm. 
L.J. (2003) at 183 Table 8.  
 
100 Analysts suggested that the broker fee for arranging such sales was approximately 3%. 
101 See E-Trade US commission sheet at < https://us.etrade.com/e/t/home/generalgen>   - 35-   
estimate the pure transactions cost at 0.8% in Delaware and 0.62% in Maryland.
102  This 
upper bound appears to be a rather modest transaction burden, particularly if a full 
property rights market drives down brokerage costs to under 3% as seems likely.  The 
pecuniary costs of transacting spectrum licenses does not appear to be a significant 
hindrance to the market. 
 
Benkler suggests that one important transaction cost comes from the difficulty of 
predicting the value of a frequency band in markets with uncertainty, which certainly 
describes spectrum markets.  However, this assertion flies in the face of the fact that 
many markets not only thrive in the presence of uncertainty, they actually are markets for 
uncertainty.  Capital markets (stocks, bonds, futures, options, etc.) and commodity 
markets are obvious examples.  In fact, almost every asset market bears elements of risk 
and uncertainty, yet asset markets generally perform quite well.  The assertion that 
uncertainty about returns would in any way discourage markets runs counter to every 
piece of evidence concerning the performance of asset markets.  The evidence concerning 
recent transactions of spectrum licenses also runs counter to this assertion. 
 
Werbach
103 also mentions monopoly as a problem with markets, a view shared by many 
commons advocates.  In fact, it would appear that commons advocates believe that the 
natural state of markets is monopolization.  In fact, the empirical evidence supports the 
opposite.  Currently, the spectrum use with greatest market value is cellular telephony, 
presumably the likeliest candidate for this alleged monopolization.  Yet the Department 
of Justice and the FCC recently concluded that the industry was competitive enough to 
permit the merger of AT&T Wireless and Cingular, with only minimal requirements for 
divestitures.  If monopoly doesn’t exist in wireless today, does it exist in markets that are 
similar to what a full property rights market in spectrum licenses would be, such as asset 
markets?  National asset markets, such as markets for financial products, are famously 
competitive.  Even localized asset markets, such as real estate markets, are notably free of 
monopoly.  The assertion that spectrum markets would be monopolized simply cannot be 
supported by the evidence.  In fact, most existing monopolies owe their privileged status 
to government protection (either current or the recent past).  Telephone, electric power 
distribution, cable TV all gained their strong market power as regulated monopolies.  
This is not to say that most markets are perfectly competitive in the ideal 
conceptualization of introductory economics.  But rivalrous behavior and aggressive 
competition, such as in cellular telephony, appears to be the norm in US markets that we 
all experience daily. 
 
Lessig
104 makes a similar point in noting that a perfectly competitive market must price 
each use of spectrum at every second at its marginal cost, including opportunity and 
congestion cost.  Since this is clearly impossible (on transaction cost grounds), economic 
efficiency cannot be achieved and so a commons is preferable.  This argument strains 
                                                 
102 Based on a sample of 40 real estate transactions; pure transactions cost include all settlement fees and 
title insurance.  They do not include broker fees (uniform at 5% or 6%), financing and mortgage company 
fees; or state and county transfer taxes (which are unique to real estate). 
103 Supra note 31 at 419. 
104 Supra note 11.   - 36-   
credulity.  Almost no real world markets fit the ideal conceptualization of perfect 
competition.  In communication markets such as wired and wireless telephony and 
Internet, pricing is almost never priced at precise marginal cost.  In fact, it is usually flat-
rate priced (such as local wired telephone service, Internet service) or priced in “buckets’ 
(such as wireless service).  While this doesn’t meet the ideal conceptualization, these 
examples are the result of competitive market forces responding to what customers want.  
These markets are working just fine and no economist would recommend they be 
dismantled because they do not meet an ideal conceptualization. 
 
Tragedies of The Commons and Anticommons  
 
Commons advocates respond to the problem of the tragedy of the commons by noting 
that users (or manufacturers of devices) are able to come together to solve their 
communal problems outside the context of law.  Examples include a successful self-
imposed code of conduct for amateur radio and the ability of ranchers grazing open range 
to develop a complex set of rules and protocols for use of the commons grazing land.
105  
They also suggest that some “light” regulatory oversight may be needed to enhance these 
self-organizing systems.  It is certainly correct to assert regulatory oversight is required.  
As previously noted,
106 game theory suggests self-governance is a likely outcome only 
when a small number of players interacts over a long period of time.  Otherwise, 
anonymous and temporary users will have incentives to break the rules for their own 
advantage, as occurred in CB radio.  Continued regulatory oversight and enforcement is 
necessary to control this; however, FCC enforcement was not sufficient to solve the 
problems of CB radio in the late 1970s.
107  One response to a tragedy of the commons is 
for users to request more capacity.  As the 2.4 Ghz band becomes more crowded, 
commons advocates call for more (and better) bandwidth to meet their needs.  Of course, 
if the new technologies are as bandwidth-conserving as commons advocates assert, then 
there would be little need for new bandwidth; unlicensed users could operate within the 
allocated bands.  In general, in the end-state regulatory regime, congestion in unlicensed 
bands would call forth regulatory intervention, with its attendant costs, delays and 
uncertainty. 
 
In a  property rights regime, the problem is the tragedy of the anticommons.  If bigger 
blocks of spectrum are needed and cannot be obtained by conserving bandwidth within 
an existing license, it would appear necessary to negotiate with adjacent licensees in 
order to obtain needed bandwidth.  It would appear adjacent licensees may “holdup” the 
licensee in need of more spectrum, hoping to extract as much of the rent of the new 
project from the acquiring licensee.
108  But what is the underlying cause of the 
                                                 
105 See Ellickson, supra note 51, and the ensuing discussion of subsequent scholarship. 
106 Supra note 51. 
107 Enforcement need not be vested in the FCC; VHF marine radio is an unlicensed system in use by almost 
all boaters and both formal and informal protocols seem to be followed by millions of recreational boaters.  
The fact that marine police and the US Coast Guard monitor VHF channels no doubt has a disciplining 
effect. 
108 If there is only one other licensee, then the project should go forward, as the only bargaining is over who 
gets the rents.  The anticommons problem arises when there is more than one party on the opposite side, 
and each party holds out to capture all the rents.  In this case, unless the parties on the opposite side can   - 37-   
anticommons problem?  The problem only arises if two properties are satisfied: (i) 
location-specificity and (ii) contiguity.  If I wish to aggregate property around my 
existing home, then I have no choice about location: it must be where my home is 
located.  I also have no choice about what properties I must acquire: they must be 
contiguous to my current property.  A similar problem faces a developer of a shopping 
mall: there may be only one location that is most suitable for the mall, and the developer 
must purchase not only that property but all contiguous properties, leading to the holdup 
problem.  A beach town may wish to construct a walkway on its beach, but if the land is 
owned by private property owners, no other land will do, and it is all contiguous.  In this 
case, the town may choose to solve the holdup problem using eminent domain, a 
cumbersome and costly process at best. 
 
But in spectrum, neither location-specificity nor contiguity need apply.  As noted supra, 
in the new world of software-defined radio (which we assume to be relatively low cost), 
frequency changes in a transmitter can be made quite simply with a flip of a software 
switch.  A frequency change in customer-owned equipment is easily updated over the air 
in a software-defined radio world.  Further, spectrum need not be contiguous; receivers 
need not be listening on just one frequency but be “smart” enough to monitor and receive 
multiple frequencies.  I refer to this as the anti-anticommons principle.  In this case, 
commons advocates have been drawn in by the analogy to land; the anticommons is a 
problem most acute in land.  It is not a problem in spectrum, at least with the 
technologies promised by the commons advocates.  Solving the holdup problem in a  
property rights regime is as simple and low-cost as shopping for new spectrum. 
 
Although contiguity is not crucial for most applications in a world of cheap software 
defined radio, it is crucial (or at least important) for at least one technology: 
ultrawideband (UWB).  As described above, UWB is now licensed as a very low power 
service (below the noise floor) which uses a very large swath of spectrum, 1 Ghz or more.  
While it is not absolutely essential that this swath of spectrum be contiguous, it certainly 
reduces the cost of UWB if it is.  In my previous work with David Farber, I suggested 
that in a property rights regime a non-interfering easement could be granted in all 
licensed spectrum, in which any non-interfering use (such as UWB) could use licensed 
spectrum without permission provided the licensee was not using the spectrum or would 
not be interfered with by the use in question.  UWB was the anticipated use for such 
easements (called “underlay” rights in FCC-ese).  However, it was anticipated that (high 
power) agile radio could also use any licensed spectrum that was not in use by the 
licensee, provided it could vacate the spectrum within milliseconds of the licensee 
commencing use (called “overlay” rights in FCC-ese).  Further analysis suggests that the 
transaction costs and potential for abuse of agile radio’s use of a non-interfering easement 
may prevent its deployment.  Nevertheless, the concept of a non-interfering easement 
within a property rights regime certainly would accommodate the functionality for which 
commons advocates champion the commons solution.  In other words, the non-interfering 
easement with a property rights model is the commons.  It is with some surprise I note 
that having offered the same functionality of a commons within a property rights regime, 
                                                                                                                                                 
somehow organize themselves, the project will not get done and no one receives rents: hence, the tragedy 
of the anticommons.   - 38-   
the commons advocates continue to argue for a commons regime instead of a property 
rights regime.  Commons advocates apparently unwilling to accept the “win-win” 
proposition of non-interfering easements within a property rights regime that gives them 
virtually everything they claim they want.
109 
 
Flexibility to Respond to Changes in Technology and Demands  
 
New technologies meeting new demands occur regularly in wireless without requiring 
modifications or changes in existing rules.  For example, WiFi is a new technology 
meeting a new demand (for in-home networking) that fit well within the Part 15 rules at 
2.4 Ghz, and was introduced seamlessly.  Similarly, the extraordinary advances in 
cellular technology were introduced well within the cellular license rules and were 
integrated seamlessly.  However, some technologies may not fit so easily; commons 
advocates argue that both UWB and agile radio do not fit into the classic licensing model, 
although introducing the minor change of non-interfering easements into the property 
rights model appears to solve that problem.  But new technologies, unimaginable today, 
may also be disruptive of either commons rules or property rights licenses.  How robust is 
either regime to disruptive technology? 
 
There are several ways in which a new technology can impinge on existing arrangements: 
(i) a new protocol or standard could be introduced into wireless, such as spread spectrum 
in the 900 Mhz band in the 1980s; (ii) a new technology may require more or less power 
than existing rules permit; (iii) a new technology may require more or less bandwidth 
than existing bands permit; (iv) receiver technology may become more or less sensitive to 
interference; or (v) new technologies may require opportunistic or very low power use of 
existing licensed or unlicensed bands, such as agile radio or UWB. 
 
New protocols/standards The introduction of spread spectrum for cordless 
telephones under regulation and the adoption of standards for digital TV, 
discussed by Goodman,
110,111 are good model for how well the end-state 
regulatory regime would handle new protocols and standards in both licensed and 
unlicensed bands.  This suggests disruptive protocols or standards are not likely to 
fare well in the end-state regulatory regime.   
 
By contrast, in the  property right regime, licensees are free to adopt new 
standards and protocols without seeking regulatory approval.
112  Market adoption 
                                                 
109 This is not to say that non-interfering easements are obviously easy and costless to implement.  
Permitting alternative uses of licensed spectrum by random transmitters raised serious and difficult 
questions regarding methods of ensuring true non-interference, monitoring for non-interference, 
enforcement and identification issues that cannot be ignored.  Should these problems be more costly to 
solve than the social value of the easement, clearly the easement concept should not be implemented. 
110 Goodman, supra note 3, at 376. 
111 Goodman, supra note 3, at 377. 
112 The theory of regulation discussed above suggests that regulation provides a mechanism by which 
competitors can seek to disadvantage innovators from adopting new technologies.  The openness of the 
regulatory process ensures that anyone can object to any proposal to introduce technology that requires 
regulatory approval.  Further, the theory also suggests that the scope of regulation will expand to cover new   - 39-   
of new standards is never a smooth process and may result in inefficiencies.
113  
However, there is little evidence that regulatory standard setting is an 
improvement, especially given the opportunities for rent-seeking in the regulatory 
standard setting process. 
 
Flexible power limits If a new technology reduces the power limit required for a 
particular use, there is little incentive for individual users in an unlicensed band to 
adopt this new technology.  Manufacturers of devices using unlicensed spectrum 
have some incentive to introduce power-conserving technologies, as it means they 
may be able to sell more devices.  But this incentive is muted in that its 
introduction means that all manufacturers can sell more devices, leading to a free 
rider problem.  These problems are not present in licensed bands; licensees have 
the incentive to introduce power-conserving technologies as they are the 
immediate beneficiaries of it.  They may even choose to sell off some capacity 
should this occur. 
 
If the new technology increases required power, then the end-state regulatory 
regime faces difficult negotiations in both licensed and unlicensed bands.  
Neighboring bands might be required to increase the quality of their receivers to 
tune out additional out of band power and neighboring locations might be 
required to do the same.  In existing unlicensed bands, a changeout of all devices 
may be required to accommodate the new technology.  Alternatively, a new 
unlicensed band could be established for the new technology if one were 
available.  At best, these options are likely to be quite difficult, take a very long 
time, and may not be successful.  In a  property rights model, a licensee who 
wished to use the new power-increasing technology could engage in neighborly 
bargaining with licensees in adjacent frequencies and locations.  This bargaining 
would include possible payments to neighbors to adjust to higher power levels, or 
the buyout of the neighbors’ licenses.  Should this fail, the licensees could buy 
new spectrum licenses covering enough bandwidth and enough locations to 
enable it to deploy the new technology, as is implied in the anti-anticommons 
principle. However, the application could be location-specific, in which case 
options for deployment are more limited. 
 
In sum, technologies that decrease power requirements are more likely to be 
deployed and exploited in a property rights regime rather than the end-state 
regulatory regime.  Technologies that increase power requirements are in general 
more difficult to deploy in either regime, but are somewhat more likely to find 
success in the property rights regime. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
technologies should these innovations be perceived as a threat to other market participants.  These 
institutional mechanisms are simply not present in the property rights model. 
113 See Stanley M. Besen and Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategy and Tactics in 
Standardization 8 Journal of Economic Perspectives, 117 (Spring 1994). 
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Flexible bandwidth If the new technology enables applications to use less 
bandwidth than previously, the analysis of the previous section on power also 
applies.  The incentives to deploy the technology in unlicensed bands is somewhat 
muted.  In licensed bands, licensees have incentives to economize on bandwidth, 
not only to increase the use of their license but also to sell or lease any unneeded 
bandwidth. 
 
If the technology increases bandwidth needed for applications, then the end-state 
regulatory regime may observe that existing unlicensed bands become more 
congested, leading to a tragedy of the commons.  The regulator can respond to 
this by purchasing licensed spectrum and converting it to unlicensed spectrum, or 
it could impose new rules and limitations on users and manufacturers restricting 
the use of the new technology.  Again, we would expect that regulatory resolution 
of this conflict would be costly and lengthy, and possibly not successful.   
 
In the  property rights regime, licensees who wish to expand their bandwidth to 
take advantage of the new technology can engage in neighborly bargaining with 
their neighbors to accept higher levels of out of band power, or they may 
negotiate the purchase of neighboring bands.  Failing this, licensees can choose to 
sell their current spectrum and move to a new, larger frequency band at relatively 
low cost, as argued above.  In fact, they may purchase several contiguous bands 
and aggregate them.  The same mechanism would apply in the end-state 
regulatory regime, except that a competitor may petition the regulator to intervene 
on its behalf to halt this market transaction. 
 
Thus, bandwidth-conserving technologies are more likely to be deployed in a  
property rights regime than in the end-state regulatory regime, as licensees can 
internalize the benefits of the innovation whereas users and manufacturers in 
unlicensed spectrum are handicapped in this regard.  Bandwidth-increasing 
technologies are likely to lead to a tragedy of the commons in unlicensed 
spectrum, calling for regulatory intervention with its attendant costs, delays and 
uncertainty.  In contrast, deployment of such a technology in a  property rights 
regime calls for license aggregation: buying the licenses of adjacent licensees.  
Recalling the principle of the anti-anticommons, this should be both simple and 
low-cost. 
 
Even without the deployment of software-defined radio, the evidence suggests 
that spectrum can be aggregated.  The aggregation occurred during the 1990s, 
when a number of large wireless firms that owned licenses in some metro areas 
wished to expand their networks to have national scope.  This required them to 
purchase specific frequency bands in specific locations, generally from other 
cellular companies, to fill out their networks.  More dramatically, Nextel 
purchased over 40,000 SMR licenses nationwide to obtain nationwide coverage.  
In both situations, the firms managed to solve the holdup problem and put   - 41-   
together nationwide networks.  This process took time and money, but it did not 
stop any of the firms involved.
114 
 
Lastly, what might occur if the bandwidth devoted to different management 
options needs to change?  For example, it could be that commons-managed 
spectrum is wildly successful and needs to be expanded at the expense of property 
rights-managed spectrum.  In the end-state regulatory regime, the decision 
becomes regulatory; the regulator would have to decide how to value commons 
spectrum (as there would be no market price), how much spectrum to convert to 
commons, what bands were most appropriate, and then purchase the required 
licenses at market (and subject to holdup problems).  It would then have to decide 
what commons uses would be permitted to use the newly available spectrum, 
including power limits and protocols.  Each of these decisions could be expected 
be costly, delayed and highly uncertain.  In a  property rights regime, licensees 
that held their bands for open access would find their market value increase and 
seek to purchase new bandwidth licenses to expand their services.  Alternatively, 
current spectrum licensees could also assess the market value of open access 
spectrum and choose to convert their current spectrum to open access.  Included 
in this group of potential agents would be government (at any level) that could 
purchase licenses and convert them from exclusive use to commons use, if there 
were sufficient political demand for this.  On the other hand, it could be that 
spectrum devoted to open access is less valuable than exclusive use spectrum; we 
would expect that licensees of commons spectrum would convert their frequency 
bands from commons to exclusive use, much the way an owner of an apartment 
building may convert the building from rental units to a condominium.  This 
market-driven process would provide much clearer signals regarding the value of 
moving spectrum to or from open access/unlicensed to exclusive use. 
 
In sum, the property rights regime is likely to adjust rather easily to technology 
and demand changes requiring changes in required bandwidth.  The end-state 
regulatory regime can rely on market mechanisms to be flexible for licensed 
bands, but is liable to encounter tragedy of the commons problems in unlicensed 
bands, which can only be resolved by regulatory interventions that are costly, 
delayed and uncertain.  The overall allocation of bandwidth from commons to 
property rights and back is liable to be difficult in the end-state regulatory regime 
and relatively automatic in the property rights regime. 
 
Some Illustrative Hypotheticals 
 
                                                 
114 The holdup problem is particularly severe in land, where developers must acquire contiguous land at a 
particular site for a successful project (indeed, almost all examples of the holdup problem used by 
commons advocates are based on land).  Even here, aggregators have come up with interesting and 
compelling solutions: an aggregator can make a (generous) “all or nothing” offer to landholders, stipulating 
that individual offers are contingent upon all offers being accepted.  In established neighborhoods, for 
example, such offers can change the social dynamic among neighbors from common resistance and holdups 
to common acceptance and social sanctions against holdouts.  My thanks to Hon. Stephen F. Williams for 
this observation.   - 42-   
In order to illustrate how each regime would operate in practice, I consider three cases in 
which an individual, firm, or agency would operate within each regime, comparing the 
costs and benefits of each regime for each of the three cases: a full time exclusive use 
broadcaster, a two-way communication service (voice or data), and a municipality with 
public safety needs. 
 
Case A: Broadcasting A firm or individual wishes to operate a high-powered transmitter 
to broadcast entertainment (such as FM radio or TV) or other full-time exclusive use 
(such as an airport radar) in an SMSA (or nationally). 
 
Property Rights Regime The firm or individual purchases a spectrum license in 
the open market for the necessary bandwidth, power, and location(s).  This is 
almost identical to the purchase of a radio station (or network of radio stations) in 
today’s market.  If the operator wished to use the existing base of inexpensive 
receivers, it would be limited to broadcasting in bands the “dumb” receivers could 
tune in.  However, the operator could choose to broadcast at any frequency it 




If an immediate neighbor (in geographic space or frequency space) claimed that 
the operator was operating outside the power bounds specified in its license, the 
operator could hire a third party technical firm to verify that it was in compliance 
with its license (or not), and appropriate action be taken. Note that the number of 
neighbors is small.
116  In frequency space, there are only two immediate 
neighbors, on either side of the licensee’s band (although in some cases non-
adjacent bands could be affected, the number of “neighbors” remains small).  In 
geographic space, only licensees in the three or four contiguous MSAs are 
immediate neighbors.
117  This could involve fixing a problem if it exists 
(requesting a grace period from the neighbor), or notifying the neighbor that the 
firm is in compliance.  In this case, should the immediate neighbor decide to bring 
suit, the third party firm’s data could be used in the firm’s defense.   If the firm is 
in compliance but the neighbor is legitimately suffering interference as a result of 
                                                 
115 The “smart” radio would have radio stations such as “Power 99” or “Smooth Listening.”  In each city, 
this station might be broadcasting on a different frequency, or the frequency in a particular city may change 
over time.  The “smart radio” would receive a download, perhaps once a day or whenever it was turned on, 
updating the local frequencies of all entertainment broadcasters, much as DNS servers in the Internet 
download update DNS information from the Internet root servers periodically, so that they may direct 
traffic appropriately for new servers and discontinued servers. 
116 The interference detection problem is made more difficult if a non-interfering easement is present.  A 
licensee may need to monitor its licensed spectrum to ensure that opportunistic users such as agile radios 
stay within their easement limits.  This monitoring could be continuous or only in response to regular 
interruptions; the firm itself could do the monitoring or it could hire a third party monitor to detect and 
record out-of-easement power emissions.  Under a property rights with non-interfering easement regime, 
agile radios would likely be required to broadcast an identifier so that infringers could be tracked and 
prosecuted. (supra at 25).  
117 If the licensee significantly violates its licensed limits, it could impinge on more distant bands and 
locations.  But as a general rule, the immediate neighbors suffer the most significant interference and have 
the greatest incentive to complain and/or bring action.   - 43-   
the firm’s broadcasting, the two neighbors would engage in Neighborly 
bargaining.  As neighbors with a fairly long term relationship, we would expect 
such bargaining would be successful; each neighbor would have an interest in 
maintaining a cordial relationship with the other to ensure that future problems 
can be resolved at low cost.  Failing successful bargaining, the party suffering 
interference may attempt to bring suit under nuisance law, in which case the court 
must balance relative economic harms and costs of remediation.  It is likely, 
however, that a court would find a transmitter operating within its license 
parameters not to be creating a nuisance.  If the issue is still not resolved, the 
party suffering interference either mitigates the interference by upgrading 
receivers or purchases a spectrum license in a different band. 
 
End-state regulatory regime If the radio and TV bands continue to be allocated 
by the regulators to exclusive use, then the firm or individual will most likely 
purchase an existing radio or TV license and would proceed as today.  If the firm 
or individual chooses to purchase other frequencies to which today’s “dumb” 
radios or TVs are not tuned, then the firm would have to rely on customers 
adopting “smart” radios, as described supra. 
 
Dispute resolution in the exclusive use portion of the spectrum would likely 
remain with the FCC.  There is ample evidence regarding the speed and efficacy 
of the FCC dispute resolution process, in particular its bias in favor of incumbents 
and the open nature of proceedings that permits intervention by competitors and 
other rent-seekers.
118  In essence, today’s regulatory regime of dispute resolution 
is duplicated in the end-state regulatory regime, with all its attendant costs and 
biases. 
 
It is not at all clear how entertainment broadcasting could work in a commons 
regime.  Broadcasting is typically high-powered; even using agile/cognitive 
technology (a substantial expense for both broadcasters and users) in an open 
commons, the power mix problem ensures that low-powered users would suffer 
interference.  Only further intrusive regulation could resolve this problem, and it 
would still be unattractive to broadcasters. 
 
Case A Conclusion A broadcaster could function well in a property rights 
regime, but would be more likely to encounter competition.  Broadcast licenses 
would no longer command economic rents (unless there was an identification of a 
particular frequency with a brand name, such as “Power 99” in Philadelphia).  In 
the end-state regulatory regime, broadcasters would function much as they do 
today in the exclusive use portion of the spectrum, and still subject to FCC 
dispute resolution.  They are unlikely to be able to function at all in a commons 
regime.  The exclusive use licenses in the end-state regulatory regime promise the 
transactional flexibility of the property rights regime but continue regulatory 
dispute resolution, allocation of spectrum between exclusive use and commons, 
regulatory selection of protocols and standards, and lobbying and other rent-
                                                 
118 Goodman, supra note 3, at 376-377.   - 44-   
seeking activity, with its attendant excessive delays and excessive costs. 
 
 
Case B: Two-way Communication Service (voice/data) A firm, individual or government 
agency wishes to establish a two-way communication system within one or more 
locations.  This case includes a very broad array of systems; examples include: 
 
•  Systems designed for customers of the firm to use, such as a cell phone system or a 
wireless computer data system.
119  This would involve a localized wireless network 
accessing a landline network that connects with other wireless and wireline 
communication systems.  Typically (but not always), such systems are open to all 
customers, decentralized and often use multiple antennas within an area. 
•  Systems designed for a firm/agency’s employees to use for internal communications.  
This would include such examples as police radio, fire radio, taxi dispatch, and firms 
with locally dispersed employees, such as construction firms or delivery firms.  
Typically (but not always), such systems are closed to all but the operating firm, have 
a central focal node, such as a dispatcher, and often use a single antenna within an 
area. 
 
Both types of systems are similar enough so that their options under a property rights 
regime are roughly the same and their options under an end-state regulatory regime are 
roughly the same.  In fact, some systems, such as Nextel’s cell phone cum walkie-talkie 
system, fit both categories. 
 
Property Rights regime The firm selling to end-customers would purchase 
sufficient frequency space in all locations; if the same frequency bands were 
available in all locations, then the firm could use fairly simple user devices, much 
like today’s cell phones.  If not, the firm could buy different frequency bands in 
different locations and require the use of smart phones by its customers to enable 
the phones to switch frequency bands in each city.  Otherwise, the system would 
operate as today’s cell phone systems work: the firm would attempt to attract as 
many customers as possible, offering them a wide variety of user devices (phones 
or PC cards for data services) and a wide variety of payment plans.  The firm 
could choose to deploy a technology using multiple antennas that connect into the 
national telephone system (or the Internet, if data), or they could deploy a peer-to-
peer mesh network, in which the infrastructure is contained within the user 
devices themselves, obviating the need for an antenna infrastructure.  Typically, a 
service firm would deploy a system with infrastructure, establishing rules of use 
and acceptable user devices, while a device firm would be more likely to deploy a 
mesh network, building rules of use and protocols into the individual devices.  In 
either case, the firm would hold the licenses for the frequencies and locations 
necessary for the system to work. 
 
In the case of a mesh network deployed within a licensed frequency band and 
location, the user devices could be designed so that they could use up to the 
                                                 
119 Examples of such data systems include GPRS, 1xEVDO, WiFi and WiMax.   - 45-   
maximum permitted power level if the density of users was low and the nearest 
user device (which would be the relay point) was many miles away.  As the 
density of users increased, the power levels could be reduced, since the nearest 
user device may only be several feet away.  This ability to vary power depending 
on the density of the network enables a mesh network to be economically viable 
at low device densities.  As the density increases, power can be reduced, leading 
to what David Reed has called cooperation gain.
120  However, this cooperation 
gain can only be achieved at fairly high device densities, and its benefit is 
severely limited if the required multiple “hops” to complete a message results in 
unacceptable delays (latency).  Within a property rights regime, a mesh network 
may trade off cooperation gain by using higher powered devices to reduce latency 
problems (fewer hops) and handle lower device densities. 
 
Interference problems among users within a frequency band can be managed by 
the licensee, perhaps by updating software within the permitted devices and 
controlling the number of devices sold in a particular location if necessary.  
Whether the licensee is operating a mesh network or a more traditional 
communications network with an antenna infrastructure, it is the licensee that is 
responsible for policing its own spectrum to ensure that interference does not 
occur, and has the legal authority to take action if necessary.  Further, it is in the 
interest of the licensee to offer an acceptable level of interference (generally low 
but not necessarily zero) to attract and retain customers in the context of a 
competitive market. 
 
If the immediate neighbors complain of interference due to out-of-license power 
emissions from the licensee’s customers, both the licensee and his neighbors have 
the same options available as in Case A; each can hire a third-party monitor to 
detect, measure and record the presence or absence of out-of-license emissions.  If 
a suit is brought, the records of the third-party monitors should be decisive in 
reaching a swift decision, suggesting it is unlikely that most cases would actually 
be tried.  If the neighbor suffered legitimate interference from the licensee 
operating within his license constraints, then the neighbor and the licensee could 
engage in Neighborly bargaining; since they have an ongoing relationship as 
neighbors, it is likely such bargaining would be successful.  Otherwise, the 
neighbor could bring suit under nuisance law, in which the court would decide on 
the basis of relative harms.  If this does not resolve the issue, the neighbor can 
take mitigating action (such as buying new receivers) or move to other spectrum.  
Of course, this would involve changing the frequencies of both transmitters and 




                                                 
120 David P. Reed, Comments for FCC Spectrum Task Force on Spectrum Policy (July 8, 2002), at 
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513202407. 
 
121 Even with today’s not-very-smart cell phones, information can be downloaded over the air to each 
phone, updating roaming information, e.g.   - 46-   
End-state regime Deployment of a two-way voice or data communications 
system in the end-state regime offers both opportunities and problems.  A service 
firm could provide a system with infrastructure within the exclusive use portion of 
the spectrum simply by purchasing the spectrum.  Such an operation would be 
almost identical to offering cellular phone service today, except that service 
providers would have greater freedom to purchase spectrum in an open market 
with few of today’s constraints.  This would also entail continued FCC oversight 
and dispute resolution.  One recent example of how convoluted and costly is this 
oversight and dispute resolution is the current Nextel band relocation case, 
discussed supra, at 21.
122 
 
Could a service firm deploy a system with infrastructure in a commons spectrum?  
This would seem unlikely; as such systems usually depend upon high power (as 
do cellular systems today).  If the system were deployed in an open commons, it 
would certainly require agile radios in order to avoid interference with other high 
powered users.  But it would also be subject to the power mix problem, and would 
likely interfere with low powered users which it would be unable to detect.  Only 
if the low powered users deployed agile technology would they manage to avoid 
interference from high powered users such as a cellular-type system.  This would, 
of course, impose a cost on low powered users they would not have to bear if only 
low powered users were permitted.  This suggests that a regulator may have to 
segregate commons for high powered users from commons for low powered 
users, which again involves regulatory decisions which are likely to be 
disputatious, lengthy and costly.  Additionally, operating a cellular-type system in 
an open commons, even using agile radios, subjects the system operator to the 
risk of congestion in the band; since it does not own the band and it is open to all, 
it cannot guarantee to customers a particular service level (dropped calls, failure 
to connect, etc.), and therefore cannot guarantee to investors that its business 
model will be viable in the future if and when congestion may occur. 
 
A device firm would be more likely to deploy its system as a mesh network in a 
commons or in exclusive use spectrum.  In the case of the commons, however, 
low power constraints on transmitters imply that only a high device density can 
support the service (since transceivers must be close together to act as relays for 
each other at low power).  It is unclear how such a system could get started; 
obviously a new system will have a rather low device density, and thus be 
unworkable.  It is also likely that latency problems could occur in such low power 
networks if many hops are required to transmit information.  The deployment of 
mesh networks in a low powered commons environment is problematic.  On the 
other hand, the device firm could certainly deploy its system in the exclusive use 
                                                 
122 Another example of a dispute before the FCC whose resolution was very costly and long-delayed is the 
NextWave case, involving disputed payments for auctioned licenses for spectrum to be used for wireless 
telephony.  After two trips to the Second Circuit and one trip to the DC Circuit the case was eventually 
decided by the Supreme Court after five years; during this period, the disputed spectrum was not used in 
any way to benefit the public.  See FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications et al. 537 U.S. 293 (2003) 
at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=000&invol=01-653 , which includes a 
brief history of the case.   - 47-   
portion of the spectrum simply through direct purchase. 
 
In the end-state regulatory regime, the communications service would still be 
subject to FCC dispute resolution, should interference occur.  If cheating (such as 
using a pirate radio) is beneficial to the cheater even if costly to other commons 
users, there is a potential enforcement tragedy of the commons.  This need not be 
the case of all such commons.  For example, many Part 15 devices today work 
together quite well; there is no benefit to users of garage door openers or to users 
of inside/outside weather stations to increase their power.  But CB radio during 
the late 1970s offers an example in which pirate devices caused substantial 
interference for the simple reason that it was in the interest of the pirate to 
increase power and the likelihood of enforcement was quite low. 
 
Case B Conclusion Two-way communications services from a service firm with 
antenna infrastructure are unlikely to be offered in a commons environment; the 
power mix problem may work against this high-powered use.  The property rights 
regime appears to be their natural métier, as evidenced by today’s highly 
successful cellular service.  Device firms offering mesh networks are likely to 
find the variable-powered property rights regime preferable to the low-powered 
commons regime, in that the former allows them to solve the device density 
problem.  As above, the exclusive use licenses in the end-state regime promise the 
transactional flexibility of the property rights regime but continue regulatory 
dispute resolution, allocation of spectrum between exclusive use and commons, 
regulatory selection of protocols and standards, and lobbying and other rent-
seeking activity, with its attendant excessive delays and excessive costs. 
 
Case C: Public Safety  A municipality wishes to establish (more likely, to continue) 
police, fire and emergency radio services for its public safety agencies.  The demands of 
public safety agencies for radio spectrum are rather unique: at most times, the need is for 
administrative and isolated emergency traffic among mobile units and headquarters, 
using relatively little bandwidth.  However, at times of civil disturbance or catastrophe, 
the needs change dramatically; many units are simultaneously deployed and must 
coordinate activities, within and sometimes between agencies.  The bandwidth 
requirements for public safety may increase dramatically at these times, and the ability of 
public safety agencies to protect and serve the public depends critically on having 
sufficient bandwidth, free of interference, to communicate instantly.  Negotiations are not 
possible and compromise is not an option; clear communications requiring multiples of 
the normal bandwidth requirements are essential. 
 
Property Rights regime Municipalities have already been allocated spectrum in 
today’s regime and would be most likely to keep it under the new property rights 
regime.  The amount of bandwidth allocated for public safety tends to be the 
maximum bandwidth needed for public emergencies; as a result, much of the 
bandwidth allocated for public safety lies fallow.  Municipalities could adopt two 
strategies to improve their spectrum efficiency without compromising their 
mission goals:   - 48-   
•  Municipalities could adopt new digital technologies for transmission and 
reception which could reduce their bandwidth needs.  They could then sell 
off the unneeded spectrum to others, covering the cost of the new 
equipment while helping the municipal finances.  Ownership of the license 
ensures that municipalities have the incentive to engage in this mutually 
beneficial trade.  Under the current regulatory regime, they do not. 
•  In order to use their normally spare capacity, municipalities could also sell 
rights to others to use their spectrum during non-emergency periods using 
special cognitive radios.  During an emergency, a signal would be 
broadcast that would shut down all non-emergency spectrum use,
123124 so 
that all available bandwidth would be used for emergency traffic only.  
Examples of potential customers for these overlay rights would be 
construction firms and delivery companies.  Municipalities would benefits 
by receiving revenues for the spectrum they control when they do not need 
it, and users willing to tolerate interruptions get access to spectrum at 
lower cost.  Ownership of the license ensures that municipalities have the 
incentive to engage in this mutually beneficial trade. Under the current 
regulatory regime, they do not. 
 
Should the licensees create interference by violating the license terms, or receive 
interference from a neighboring licensee violating its license terms, recourse to 
the courts would be direct, and third-party monitors could generate evidence 
regarding adherence by the parties to license terms.  Because of the life-or-death 
nature of public safety services, neighbors violating their license terms may be 
subject to criminal as well as civil penalties.  Interference caused by neighbors 
operating within their license terms could be handled by Neighborly bargaining or 
by bringing suit under nuisance law, should that fail.  Alternatively, either party 
can sell their spectrum and move to a different band. 
 
Users of underlay spectrum could also violate the conditions of use, perhaps using 
an unauthorized device that did not turn off on command (just as a motorist today 
may refuse to yield the right-of-way to an emergency vehicle); they would then be 
subject to civil and perhaps criminal penalties (as is the unyielding motorist 
today) for such violations. 
 
If the municipality wishes to move to a newer system, it may need less bandwidth 
or more.  If it needs less, it can move to the newer system and sell off the 
unneeded  bandwidth to help offset the cost of the new system.  If it needs more 
                                                 
123 The municipality could require that only certain devices be used in this underlay spectrum, which 
devices would have hardware embedded that would turn them off upon receipt of the “off” signal broadcast 
by public safety officials.   
124 If a non-interfering easement is adopted for all spectrum including public safety, then the overlay right 
discussed here would be senior to the “free” overlay right of the non-interfering easement.  Specifically, the 
owner of the overlay right discussed could broadcast as long as there was no emergency, and it would have 
an absolute right to transmit over anyone using the non-interfering easement.  Only if the public safety 
agency and the owner of the underlay right were not transmitting could an agile radio use the non-
interfering easement in this band.   - 49-   
bandwidth, it can bargain with its neighbors to buy a license for a contiguous 
band, or it can buy a license for a non-contiguous band and use software defined 
radios to manage the use of multiple bands within a single device. 
 
End State regime Public safety agencies would likely prefer to use exclusive use 
spectrum in this regime, taking advantage of the transactional capabilities outlined 
above.  The only difference would be the continued oversight of the FCC and that 
dispute resolution would remain a regulatory function.  The current proceedings 
regarding the interference issues in the 800 Mhz band involving Nextel and public 
safety agencies is a clear case study demonstrating the excessively long and 
excessively costly regulatory dispute resolution. 
 
Using the commons for public safety seems highly undesirable.  Public safety 
radio is generally high powered, and thus could cause the power mix problem if 
used in an open commons.  If public safety radios are used in a high power 
commons only, then they would have to be agile, and yet still be subject to 
possible congestion, or tragedy of the commons.  A public emergency when life 
and limb are in danger is no time for a police radio to be blocked by a teenager 
using an agile phone to download pictures from Penthouse Magazine during a 
traffic burst.  While commons advocates may claim this is unlikely, whose life are 
we willing to bet on this? 
 
Case C Conclusion A property rights regime is quite friendly to public safety 
use, even permitting costs to decline and additional revenues to be realized for 
municipalities.  In the end-state regime, using a commons for public safety radio 
is undesirable; in a public emergency, first responders must be able to access the 
bandwidth they need without competing with other users of the commons.  As 
above, the exclusive use licenses in the end-state regime promise the transactional 
flexibility of the property rights regime but continue regulatory dispute resolution, 
allocation of spectrum between exclusive use and commons, regulatory selection 
of protocols and standards, and lobbying and other rent-seeking activity, with its 





The purpose of this paper is to review the current state of the property rights vs. 
commons debate, to parse the question into its constituent parts in order to clarify where 
the disputants agree and where the disputants disagree, and to focus attention on the four 
key properties of the overarching legal regime: dispute resolution, transactions costs, 
tragedies of the commons and anticommons, and flexibility for changes in technology 
and demands. 
 
The core of the paper lays out in some detail what we can expect from regulation based 
on evidence, and also lays out a legal framework for a property rights regime.  It then 
analyzes each regime on the basis of the four factors above.  For one of those factors, the   - 50-   
end-state regulatory regime has the advantage, at least in commons-managed spectrum: 
there are no transactions costs associated with buying, selling or leasing spectrum.  In the 
case of the property rights regime, the evidence suggest that these transactions costs are 
likely to be rather small, and therefore not a decisive issue.  For all other factors, the 
property rights regime appears to dominate the end-state regulatory regime. 
 
The new technologies have been a driving force in this debate, and without exception 
these technologies hold much promise.  However, these technologies do not favor one 
regime over the other.  These technologies enable the commons, in the sense that they 
help solve the tragedy of the commons (interference) problem; but they support property 
rights, in the sense that they help solve the holdup (tragedy of the anticommons) 
problem..  The technologies cannot tell us the regime to choose; but they do make it 
easier to implement either regime. 
 
It is important to recall that the focus of this paper is the evaluation of two “end-state” 
regimes, while ignoring costs associated with transitioning from today’s regime to the 
preferred end-state regulatory regime.  The economic and political costs of transition may 
differ greatly between the property rights regime and the end-state regulation regime, and 
these transition costs are important in making a good regime choice.  But it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to undertake the task of analyzing these costs. 
 
Ultimately, the choice of overarching legal regime comes down to a choice between 
regulation and markets.  There is much evidence about the economic performance of 
regulation, not least from FCC regulation over the past 70 years.  Markets in spectrum 
licenses are small and very imperfect; yet the existing spotty evidence suggests they work 
moderately well.  The fears of commons advocates of monopoly, holdup problems and 
huge transactions costs simply don’t withstand careful analysis.  The conclusion seems 
clear. 